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INTRODUCTION
Following the tenth anniversary of the September 11th attacks, and in
all the seemingly endless talk of whether to close the detention centers at the
U.S. Naval Base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, 2 it is worth remembering that
'Lecturer in Law, University of Miami School of Law. My thanks to Annette Torres and
Judge Vance Salter for their encouragement and careful review and to Sarah Wyman for her
research assistance. I am especially grateful to Marcos D. Jiminez, without whose generos-
ity-of ideas, materials, and comments-t could not have written this Article. I look forward
to his rebuttal.
2 On January 22, 2009-forty-eight hours after his inauguration-President Obama signed
an executive order directing closure of the Guantgnamo detention centers within a year. In
July 2009, the President granted an extension of six months for his task force to examine
detention policy at the base. On December 16, 2009, the President signed an executive order
acquiring an Illinois state prison as a replacement for the Guantinamo detention centers. On
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now is not the first time the base has held a group of people the United
States wanted to contain in a "rights-free zone."' This Article casts a cur-
rent eye on events before 9/11, exploring two contrasting outcomes of the
U.S. government's housing in Guantinamo camps of more than 33,000 Cu-
ban rafters intercepted at sea in August 1994.
One outcome arose in the judicial sphere. This discussion focuses on
the lawsuit the Cuban rafters filed while in Guantinamo, identifying them-
selves as refugees and seeking constitutional due process rights.4 The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Cuban American Bar Association, Inc.
v. Christopher ("CABA") denied the rafters relief.' Describing them as "mi-
grants" seeking freedom in the United States who were "temporarily pro-
vided safe haven," the court concluded that these individuals were beyond
the reach of the Constitution. 6 The Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.' More than a decade later, however, the Supreme Court did hear and
decide Boumediene v. Bush, a case concerning constitutional privileges for a
different group in Guantinamo: foreign nationals apprehended in Afghani-
stan and other distant countries seeking constitutional habeas corpus rights.'
In Boumediene, the Court granted relief to "enemy combatants" who alleg-
edly sought to kill Americans and were "detained" in military prisons.' The
Court found that these individuals captured in the War on Terror were within
the reach of the Constitution.
A different outcome arose in the political sphere. This discussion fo-
cuses on the Cuban refugees' desperate departures from their homeland and
difficult lives in Guantdnamo camps. Newly revealed documents from the
CABA litigation, including thousands of handwritten requests for counsel,
show the refugees' frustration and despair in their own words. One wrote of
fleeing Castro's regime after being imprisoned in a place called Brisas del
Mar or "Sea Breezes," a poignant name for a site that held refugees who
braved the open sea for freedom, only to be returned to camps on the Island.
In the summer of 1995, the Clinton administration finally granted humanita-
March 7, 2011, he signed an executive order permitting the base to continue detention opera-
tions. See Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13524,
74 Fed. Reg. 67,803 (Dec. 16, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7,
2011); see also Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 25, 2011, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/nationallusstatesterritoriesandpossessions/guantanamobay
navalbasecuba/index.html; Robert Farley, Obama Announces Changes To Guantdnamo Deten-
tion Policy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Mar. 9, 2011, available at http://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/177/close-the-guantanamo-bay-detention-centerd.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, CABA v. Christopher, 516 U.S. 913 (1995) (arguing
that lower court ruling rendered Guantinamo "a 'rights-free' zone, in which U.S. officials
exercise limitless power over refugees, free from any constraint imposed by U.S. law")
(phrase coined by Harold Hongju Koh) (No. 95-84).
4 Haitian rafters, who were already in Guantinamo camps when the Cubans arrived, later
intervened as additional plaintiffs in the lawsuit. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
5 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995).
6 Id. at 1417, 1430.
7 516 U.S. 913 (1995).
8 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
'See id. at 732, 771.
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rian parole to all Cubans remaining in Guantinamo. 0 In the end, the refu-
gees received from the executive branch the relief they had been denied by
the judiciary.
This Article argues that the outcome in each sphere was appropriate
given how each depicted the facts. The courts drew a contrast between "mi-
grants" housed in temporary "safe haven" and "enemy combatants" force-
fully "detained" in military prisons, and conferred constitutional rights on
only the latter. That outcome finds support in criminal jurisprudence, with
the Sixth Amendment providing a ready example of rights attaching to sta-
tus, and reconciles CABA and Boumediene. By contrast, the plight of the
refugees ended when conditions in the camps became intolerable and mili-
tary officials pressured the White House to permit humanitarian entry into
the United States. That outcome finds support in conditions on the ground,
with a political rather than judicial solution, and reflects the hardship of
refugee camps in GuantAnamo.
I. PRE-9/1 1: REFUGEES IN GUANTANAMO
The story of the Cuban refugees in CABA is as much about individuals
as it is about law, specifically constitutional law and its application to non-
U.S. citizens outside U.S. borders. Ultimately, it is a story about the triumph
of individuals outside the court system.
The CABA refugees arrived in Guantinamo in the summer of 1994, af-
ter being picked up at sea and diverted away from the United States, in a
sudden reversal of U.S. policy. The background to their arrival stretches to
1959, when President Fidel Castro took power in Cuba. The United States
has long viewed Castro's regime as repressive and totalitarian, restricting
basic political and civil rights." Because this Article discusses Cuban na-
tionals who were fleeing Castro's regime and seeking a new, free life in the
United States, the Article describes them as "refugees," reflecting their self-
identification, the United Nations' definition of a refugee as "a person who
has fled his/her country owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted," 2
'0 Most Haitian refugees in Guantdnamo repatriated after Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide returned to power in 1994. See discussion infra Sections I.C and V.
" See, e.g., Lifting Cuba Sanctions: The Debate Over Travel and Remittances, 7 CONG.
DIG., Feb. 2009, available at http://congressionaldigest.com/issue/lifting-cuba-sanctions/
("Since Fidel Castro came to power in 1960, U.S. policy toward Cuba has sought to isolate the
island nation through a comprehensive economic and trade embargo to protest the repressive
policies of its communist government."); Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing
(Aug. 19, 1994) ("Castro, by his government-his rigid, repressive government-has created
economic misery in Cuba."); United States Navy Fact File, Naval Station Guantinamo Bay,
Cuba (Nov. 8, 2011) ("United States and Cuban relations steadily declined as Fidel Castro
openly declared himself in favor of Marxist ideology, and began mass jailing and executions
of Cuban dissidents.").
12 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees adopted the definition from the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: "A refugee is a person
who has fled his/her country owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
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and the dictionary definition of a refugee as "a person who flees to a foreign
country or power to escape danger or persecution." 3 The terminology is
unavoidably loaded. The White House described the Cuban nationals as
"migrants" and the issue of whether these individuals had been processed as
refugees in Guantdnamo arose in CABA.1 4 The Eleventh Circuit chose the
term "migrants," foreshadowing its holding that the Cubans lacked constitu-
tional protections."
For decades prior to the summer of 1994, the vocabulary describing
Cuban rafters was of less moment. The U.S. government had conferred on
Cuban citizens the right to enter and remain in the United States, granting
asylum to all who managed to escape the Island.' 6 The Cuban Adjustment
Act of 1966 permits "any native or citizen of Cuba" to apply for permanent
resident alien status after one year in the United States." This Act, as well
as the Refugee Act of 1980,18 the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,19 and the
consistent policies of U.S. administrations dating back to President Ken-
nedy, offered open arms to Cuban refugees fleeing Castro's regime and seek-
ing residency in the United States.
A. Cuban Rafters' Sudden Arrival at Naval Base
On August 8, 1994, following a summer of violence in Cuba among
refugees taking to the high seas to reach the United States, Castro announced
that his government would no longer patrol the coast nor forcibly prevent
emigration by boat. 20 Apparently fed up with the United States' open-arms
policy toward Cuban citizens, Castro opened the gates.21
outside the country of his/her nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to
avail himself/herself of the protection of that country." UNHCR, A POCKET GUIDE TO REFU-
GEES at 11 (2008).
" MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DIcrIONARY, Entry for "refugee" (2011), available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/refugee.
14 See 43 F.3d at 1426.
" See id. at 1429-30 and discussion infra Section II.B; accord Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney
General, Press Briefing (Aug. 19, 1994) (noting that, regarding the consideration of Cuban
rafters as refugees, "we sometimes use terms that cause confusion").
6 See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732 (80 Stat. 1161) (adjusting status of Cuban
refugees to that of lawful permanent residents).
17 Id.
" Act of March 17, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 (94 Stat. 102).
19 28 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010.
20 See 43 F.3d at 1417. In June 1994, Cuban authorities shot and killed a Cuban rafter
attempting to flee the Island. Between July 13 and August 8, 1994, thirty-seven Cubans at-
tempting to flee, as well as two Cuban officials, were killed in boat hijackings. On August 5,
1994, a riot broke out in Havana following a false rumor of boats picking up refugees. Castro
then went on television to blame the United States for the unrest and demand that the United
States deter rafters and return hijackers. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOINSIAD-
95-211, CUBA: U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIs (1995) at 3 [hereinafter
GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS]; see also CABA, 43
F.3d at 1417.
21 William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Statement on Cuba (Aug. 20, 1994) ("the Govern-
ment of Cuba has taken action to provoke a mass exodus to the United States").
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Thousands of Cubans immediately boarded boats, rafts, and any make-
shift vessels to flee across the Straits of Florida.22 These departures were
hasty, desperate, and dangerous. Several balseros-or rafters-died at sea,
crammed aboard unsafe vessels and drowning in the strong currents between
Cuba and South Florida. 23 Yet the risk of death did not deter many
thousands from fleeing the Island in an attempt to reach the United States.
Within ten days of Castro's announcement, approximately 8000 Cubans
arrived in South Florida.24 By contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard had previously
rescued and brought to the United States only 1300 Cuban rafters during the
first six months of 1993 and 4700 during the first six months of 1994.25 In
little more than a week in August 1994, the number of Cubans entering the
United States across the Florida Straits had nearly doubled from the entire
first half of the year.26
Although smaller in size, this new refugee influx conjured memories
for many of the 1980 Mariel boatlift, during which 125,000 Cuban refugees
arrived on the shores of South Florida.27 Thus, in 1994, Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles asked the Clinton administration to stop the influx and avoid
a repeat of Mariel.28 President Clinton took action.
On August 19, 1994, in response to what it called an "uncontrolled and
dangerous outflow from Cuba," the Administration changed the United
States' twenty-eight-year-old policy of welcoming Cuban nationals.2 9 Clinton
ordered the Coast Guard to intercept at sea all those employing "irregular
means of migration to the United States on boats and rafts" and divert them
away from the United States.30 The President, who sought to handle the
situation in "an orderly fashion," intended to stanch the flow of rafters from
Cuba and save the lives of those on unsafe boats and rafts.' He also kept
pressure on Castro to initiate democratic reforms, refusing to allow Castro to
"export his troubles to this country" and release the balseros as a "safety
valve for his problems."3 2
Cuban refugees, who had been hoping to reach the United States, were
diverted to the nearest available spot that was both outside U.S. borders and
22 "Makeshift" is an understatement; some rafters fled Cuba floating on truck tires.
23 See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1417 ("many were lost at sea").
24 See id.
2 GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CIsis, supra note 20,
at 2-3.
26 See id.
27 Administration, Lawyers Spar Over Cubans' Return, NATL L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 4;
William Booth, U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuba Refugees, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at
A03.
28 See William Booth, U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuba Refugees, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25,
1995, at A03.
29 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995); see GAO REPORT,
U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRisIS, supra note 20, at 3; William Booth,
U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuba Refugees, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at A03.
3o Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995).
' Dee Dee Myers, White House Press Secretary, Press Briefing (Aug. 18, 1994).
32 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (Aug. 19, 1994) (United States was
"making sure that Castro knows he's got to solve his problems at home.").
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within U.S. control. The Coast Guard took these tens of thousands of refu-
gees to the naval base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, an area wholly within the
physical and legal control of the United States,33 and the military quickly set
up thousands of camps as "safe havens."34 Later, to relieve overcrowding in
Guantinamo, military personnel temporarily transferred some refugees to
camps in U.S.-controlled territory in Panami.
Located in the Southeastern corner of Cuba, Guantinamo Bay is a large
harbor surrounded by steep, semi-arid hills. The United States has had an
ongoing presence in Guantinamo Bay for more than a century, originally
using the site for defense purposes during the Spanish-American War.
Under the "Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of
Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations," dated February 23, 1903, and signed
by Cuban President Tombs Estrada Palma and U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt, the United States assumed perpetual control over specified areas
of Guantdnamo Bay.3 s
The 1903 Lease Agreement is an exemplar of concision, comprising
only three articles and fewer than 800 words. It expressly balances the con-
tinued sovereignty of Cuba with the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continu-
ance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the
above described areas of land and water, on the other hand the
Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation
by the United States of said areas under the terms of this agree-
ment the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control .... 36
By its terms, the "period of the occupation" could last forever, as the lease
continues "for the time required for the purposes of coaling and naval sta-
tions."" Underscoring the perpetual nature of this lease, the countries later
agreed that it would remain in effect "[s]o long as the United States of
America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantinamo or the two
governments shall not agree to a modification.""
The U.S. naval base in Guantdnamo (nicknamed "GTMO" or
"Gitmo") covers approximately forty-five square miles of land and water
* See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling
and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter 1903 Lease
Agreement].
3 See Administration, Lawyers Spar Over Cubans' Return, NATL L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 4.
" 1903 Lease Agreement, art. III. The United States must pay an annual rent of $2000
"in gold coin of the United States" and maintain "permanent fences." Lease of Certain Areas
for Naval or Coaling Stations, U.S.-Cuba, arts. I-II, July 2, 1903, T.S. No. 426.
3 1903 Lease Agreement, art. III.
3 Id. art. I.
* Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683,
T.S. No. 866; see Lease of Certain Areas for Naval or Coaling Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. I, July
2, 1903, T.S. No. 426 (United States agrees to pay rent to Cuba "as long as the former shall
occupy and use said areas of land").
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and, until the influx of Cuban rafters, had largely focused on its original
"purposes of coaling and naval stations."" Over time, fueling replaced
coaling, and the naval station grew to form a town, complete with military
housing, a Navy Exchange, a McDonalds, a Cuban restaurant, and an open-
air movie theatre.
In August 1994, the balseros began arriving in Guantinamo under "Op-
eration Sea Signal."40 President Clinton intended the operation to be "rela-
tively short-term," while his Administration sought a solution to the rafter
crisis. 4 1 Military personnel in Guantinamo quickly absorbed tens of
thousands of Cuban refugees, who were arriving daily under the command
of the Coast Guard. Within one month, the camps housed approximately
45,000 refugees, comprising 33,000 newly arrived Cubans and 12,000 Hai-
tians who were already there.42 For those in service at the naval base, this
was a purely humanitarian operation. The military understood that it had no
law enforcement function, but only a humanitarian function to house, feed,
and provide medical services and supplies to an influx of rafters considered
migrants. 43
The military housed the rafters in dusty camps filled with brown tarp
tents and surrounded by razor concertina wire, a type of barbed wire formed
in large coils and used as military obstacles.44 Living conditions were at
best, even in the words of Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia, "margi-
nal." 45 Military officials scrambled to build tents, install portable toilets, and
gather medical supplies and other necessities quickly and in mass quanti-
ties. 46 Refugees lost privacy, sleeping in tents containing up to fifteen cots
each.47 They waited in long lines for showers in the tropical heat. 48 With
3000 portable toilets, and temperatures regularly reaching the 80s and 90s,
39 1903 Lease Agreement art. I.
40 See United States Navy Fact File, Naval Station Guantidnamo Bay, Cuba (Nov. 8, 2011).
41 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (Aug. 19, 1994); see 19 Cubans Flee
Refugee Camp In Panamd 8 Others Start Hunger Strike, Demanding To Be Allowed Into U.S.,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 1994, at 10A.
42 See discussion infra Section I.C; GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN
MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20, at 3, 9; United States Navy Fact File, Naval Station Guanti-
namo Bay, Cuba (Nov. 8, 2011).
43 See E-mail from Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners, to author (July 17, 2011)
(describing "migrant operations") (on file with author); telephone interview with Randy
Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011); Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press
Briefing (Aug. 19, 1994) ("in this situation, we're looking at migrants ... we are trying to
address the humanitarians concerns and make sure that their safety is protected").
44 William Booth, U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuba Refugees, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 1995,
at A03.
45 GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20,
at 9. If the 33,000 Cuban refugees in Guantinamo were spread out evenly over the forty-five
square miles of the naval base, each square mile would contain more than 733 people. Includ-
ing the 12,000 Haitian refugees, the result is 1000 people per square mile. By contrast, the
State of Florida contains only 350 people per square mile. U.S. CENSUS, RESIDENT POPULA-
TION DATA FOR FLORIDA (2010).
6 See GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note
20, at 9.
4 See id.; Fabiola Santiago, No Way Out: Cubans Feel Frustrated, Forgotten, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Oct. 2, 1994, at 1A.
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the stench of human waste and filth was unavoidable. 49 Six residents in the
more rustic camps contracted Hepatitis A, a disease spread in feces. 0 Guan-
tinamo officials found it difficult to deliver medical care to tens of
thousands of refugees on a naval base that had been designed to house a few
thousand military personnel with their families.
Conditions improved over time, as the camps spread through downtown
Guantinamo with its small-town facilities and feel.52 Yet, the days and
problems of mass confinement increased, with no prospect of an end date or
solution. Communications with the outside world were scant for the first
several months.53 Telephones were finally installed for collect calls to the
United States in mid-October, two months after the rafters' arrival. Mail was
delivered and posted-using special "Migrant Mail" stamps on the enve-
lopesS4 -for the first time in mid-November. One refugee hung a sign on his
tent expressing frustration with the President: "Clinton, why freedom in this
manner?"55
B. The "Clinton-Castro Accord"
While the camp residents waited, frustrated, in Guantdnamo, and while
the military pursued, remarkably, its humanitarian objective of housing tens
of thousands of balseros on short notice, the U.S. government had begun
negotiating with the Cuban government almost immediately after the bal-
48 See Will More Rafters Be Eased into the United States?, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 29, 1994,
at 28A.
' See Fabiola Santiago, No Way Out: Cubans Feel Frustrated, Forgotten, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 2, 1994, at IA.
50 See Cubans at Base, Inoculated After 6 Hepatitis Cases Found, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
18, 1994, at 11A.
"See Fabiola Santiago, No Way Out: Cubans Feel Frustrated, Forgotten, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 2, 1994, at 1A.
52 See U.S. DEPT OF STATE DISPATCH, Vol. 5, No. 44, Art. 6 (Oct. 31, 1994) (statement of
Dee Dee Myers, White House Press Secretary) ("[A]lthough much remains to be done, signif-
icant improvements have been made in the camps, including providing better food, inaugurat-
ing mail and telephone service, and improving sanitary conditions."). Given the size of the
camps and the unclear duration of the refugees' stay, Guantinamo played host to the basic
infrastructure of a community: schools, churches, libraries, and recreation centers. See GAO
REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20, at 12; Mireya
Navarro, Last of Refugees From Cuba In '94 Flight Now Enter U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996,
at 8. The refugees played sports, watched movies, listened to music, and read in libraries. See
GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20, at 12.
Singer Gloria Estefan, herself a Cuban refugee, flew to Guantdnamo from Miami and gave a
concert to camp residents. Baseball players from the Florida Marlins team visited, as well. See
Ronnie Ramos, Arocha Sees Friend In Guantdnamo Visit, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 1, 1994, at
ID.
3 See Joanne Cavanaugh, What Detained Refugees Don't Hear, They Imagine Fear, Hope
Feed Guantdnamo Rumor Mill, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1994, at 17A.
5 Notes of Marcos Jim6nez, Attorney (on file with author); see Joanne Cavanaugh, What
Detained Refugees Don't Hear, They Imagine Fear, Hope Feed Guantdnamo Rumor Mill,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1994, at 17A.
s Liz Balmaseda, Pleading For Liberty, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 1994, at IA ("Clinton,
por qu6 libertad de esta manera?").
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seros' departure from Cuba in August. These diplomatic negotiations
yielded an agreement to stop the mass departure of rafters, but provided no
apparent solution for those already in Guantinamo.
On September 9, 1994, the United States and Cuba issued a Joint Com-
muniqud that the two countries had "agreed to take measures to ensure that
migration between the two countries is safe, legal, and orderly." 6 This
agreement-derisively called the "Clinton-Castro Accord" in private con-
versations among Miami attorneys representing the Guantinamo refugees-
formally ended the open-arms policy of the United States toward Cubans
and codified Operation Sea Signal. Also, as a lexical preview of the later
Eleventh Circuit opinion ruling against the Cubans in Guantinamo, the Sep-
tember 9th agreement described an influx of "rescued" "migrants" in "safe
haven," rather than refugees in detention: "migrants rescued at sea attempt-
ing to enter the United States will not be permitted to enter the United States,
but instead will be taken to safe haven facilities outside the United States."
According to an officer of the U.S. Coast Guard at the time, it was "essential
for the government to make that distinction" because, from the perspective
of officials on the ground and at sea, adopting the refugee vocabulary would
"limit the flexibility of what you can do.""8
The United States agreed that it would allow Cuban refugees-or mi-
grants-to enter the United States only by applying for immigrant visas or
refugee admittance at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba.59 The
United States further agreed to admit at least 20,000 Cubans per year,
processed in Havana.6 0 In exchange, Castro agreed to prevent further depar-
tures of rafters using whatever "effective measures" he considered "mainly
persuasive. "61 This accord successfully stopped the exodus of rafters.6 2
s6 Cuba-United States: Joint Statement On Normalization Of Migration, Building On The
Agreement Of September 9, 1994, 35 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS, 327, 329-30 (1996). President
Clinton issued a one-sentence statement of encouragement: "This agreement, when carried
out, will help ensure that the massive flow of dangerous and illegal migration will be replaced
by a safer, legal, and more orderly process." William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Statement on
the Cuba-United States Agreement on Migration (Sept. 9, 1994).
* Cuba-United States: Joint Statement On Normalization Of Migration, Building On The
Agreement Of September 9, 1994, 35 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS, 327, 329-30 (1996).
5 Telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011).
GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20,
at 2-3.
' Cuba: Implementation of Migration Agreement, Statement by Christine Shelly, Acting
Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State (Oct. 12, 1994). This number did not include
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, who were under no numerical restrictions.
61 Cuba-United States: Joint Statement On Normalization Of Migration, Building On The
Agreement Of September 9, 1994, 35 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS, 327, 329-30 (1996); see GAO
REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20, at 2.
62 Luisa Yanez, Suit Says Rafters Should Be Able To Seek Asylum, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Oct. 25, 1994, at 6A (quoting Dennis Hays, then Coordinator for Cuban Affairs at U.S. State
Department). A former officer of the Coast Guard, Randy Beardsworth, expressed relief, stat-
ing that the agreement between the United States and Cuba was important because it
"stemmed the uncontrolled flow of migrants out of Cuba," which had been "very dangerous
and very costly in lives." Telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners
(July 22, 2011).
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Under new U.S. policy, Cuban "migrants" intercepted at sea and
brought to Guantinamo or Panami camps had three options: (1) remain in
the camps in "safe haven"; (2) repatriate to sovereign Cuba and seek formal
relief through the U.S. Interests Section in Havana; or (3) travel to a third
country willing to accept them. The key to this policy was the requirement
that refugees seek entry into the United States indirectly, that is, back
through Cuba. Attorney General Janet Reno ordered that no Cuban migrant
who had accepted safe haven in Guantinamo or PanamA would be allowed
to apply directly for a visa or asylum in the United States. For his part,
Castro pledged to receive the Guantinamo refugees back into his territory
without reprisals-a pledge that was openly doubted by many, including
Amnesty International and at least one noted survivor of Cuban prisons.63
The upshot: by halting asylum or visa applications from Guantdnamo to the
United States, the September 9th agreement blocked the only path for Cuban
refugees to seek legal entry into the United States from outside the confines
of sovereign Cuba."
Implementation of the agreement was far from smooth. Castro was not
pleased with the United States' use of Cuban land in Guantinamo to house
Cuban refugees, accusing President Clinton of creating a "concentration
camp" on territory Castro still considered an illegal U.S. occupation. 65 Yet,
despite Castro's complaints about the camps, he did not act promptly to re-
lieve the overcrowding by welcoming back his citizens. Instead, the Cuban
government restricted the refugees' return and delayed the voluntary repatri-
ation process. 66 Meanwhile, the U.S. government was negotiating with other
countries to admit the refugees, and the refugees faced two choices: stay or
go home.
The U.S. government stated that it did not want to detain the Cuban
refugees for an indefinite time or against their will.67 It could have forcibly
returned them to sovereign Cuba, but instead granted all refugees safe haven
6 See Amnesty Int'l, United States/Cuba: Cuban "Rafters" - Pawns of Two Governments,
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org ("substantial number" of Cuban refugees in Guanti-
namo "could be at risk of human rights violations if required to return home"). Members of
Amnesty International had visited the camps on September 25 and 26, 1994. See also Protes-
ters in D.C. Decry U.S. Treatment of Cuban Rafters, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 14, 1994, at 17A
(quoting Armando Valladares, who spent twenty-two years in Cuban prisons and later served
as U.S. representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights under Presidents
Reagan and Bush, that "Clinton and Castro are in a partnership in repressing the Cuban peo-
ple"); Andres Viglucci, Repatriation Of Rafters Is Blocked, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 26, 1994, at
lA.
64 See Andres Viglucci, Repatriation Of Rafters Is Blocked, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 26,
1994, at 1A. Although the White House raised the possibility of migrants seeking entry to the
United States via process in a third country, many doubted the viability of this option. See
Memorandum from Jorge L. Hernandez-Torailo to Comm. for Freedom of Guantanamo De-
tainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
6 Flight From Cuba: In Cuba; Cuba Assails Clinton on Guantdnamo Detentions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 21, 1994, at A28.
66 See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1418.
6 See id.; Memorandum from Jorge L. Hernandez-Torafio to Comm. for Freedom of
Guantanamo Detainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
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for as long as they wished to stay in camps in GuantAnamo or Panami.
According to the joint military task force in charge of the camps, those
camps provided a site for the refugees to acquire skills and prepare for the
future.6 1 It was an opportunity for betterment. The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees participated in the repatriation
process to ensure that any refugee who returned to Cuba did so voluntarily. 9
Other humanitarian groups also participated in or monitored the process, in-
cluding Amnesty International, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, and
Church World Service.70
As the refugees learned of the September 9th agreement over radio
broadcasts, more than 2500 protested what appeared to them to be official
sanction of their indefinite detention.71 A camp protest that began peacefully
turned violent within forty-eight hours.72 Back in the United States, support-
ers rallied and marched in the Little Havana neighborhood of Miami and in
front of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., in solidarity with the
Cuban refugees and against their continued detention. 73
On October 14, 1994, U.S. policy again shifted. On humanitarian
grounds, Attorney General Reno would parole into the United States any
Cuban refugees who had sponsors and were (1) over the age of 70; (2)
chronically ill, along with their caregivers; or (3) unaccompanied minors. 74
These three protocols affected fewer than 500 refugees.75 Attorney General
Reno later added a fourth protocol: she would consider parole on a case-
specific basis for children and their immediate families who would be "ad-
versely affected by long-term presence in safe haven." 76 With this additional
humanitarian protocol-now four months into the refugees' plight-the
United States effectively admitted that life in Guantinamo would be "long-
term."
In total during Operation Sea Signal, approximately 33,000 Cuban refu-
gees were intercepted at sea and taken to Guantinamo camps.7 This number
"I See Mireya Navarro, Last of Refugees From Cuba In '94 Flight Now Enter U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at 8.
69 See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1418.
70 See id.
7' See Cuban Detainees Protest Accord, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1994, at 18.
72 See id.
7 See Protesters in D.C. Decry U.S. Treatment of Cuban Rafters, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 14,
1994, at 17A; March Was Huge Wave of Hope for Cuban Freedom, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 14,
1994, at lB.
74 U.S. DEPr OF STATE DISPATCH, Vol. 5, No. 44, Art. 6 (Oct. 31, 1994) (statement of Dee
Dee Myers, White House Press Secretary); see GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994
CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIs, supra note 20, at 4; Repatriations to Cuba Off Indefinitely, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 1, 1994, at Al; William Booth, U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuba Refugees,
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at A03.
7 See William Booth, U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuban Refugees, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25,
1995, at A03; Christopher Marquis & Mirta Ojito, Asylum Given To Hundreds Of Rafters,
Elderly, Young And Sick Refugees To Win Freedom, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 15, 1994, at 1A.
7' GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRSIS, supra note 20,
at 4. Attorney General Reno added this fourth protocol on December 2, 1994.
n Reflecting the large scale and changing conditions at the camps, the exact number of
Cuban refugees taken to Guantinamo is difficult to ascertain. Sources generally mark the
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included more than 8000 who had been transferred to camps in Panamd after
September 1994 due to overcrowding and then transferred back to Guanti-
namo.18 The refugees came from all over Cuba, and the population statistics
reveal that the camps housed primarily adult men.7 9 Eighty-one percent of
the refugees were men, and nineteen percent were women; ten percent were
under the age of eighteen, and only one percent were over the age of sixty."
Not surprisingly, in light of the massive size of the refugee population
in Guantinamo, the financial costs to the United States were steep. From
August 1994, when the rafter crisis began, through fiscal year 1995, the
United States spent nearly half a billion dollars responding to the Cuban
rafter crisis."' This high financial commitment underscored the seemingly
endless nature of the refugees' wait for relief. In December 1994-four
months after Castro's August announcement and the mass departure of bal-
seros-the United States undertook a "Quality of Life" upgrade program,
intending to spend an additional $35 million from Defense Department oper-
ating funds over the following six months to improve living conditions in
Guantinamo.82 The bottom line was clear: no end was in sight.
C. Haitian Rafters Already at Naval Base
Guantinamo Bay had more than just proximity and military presence to
recommend it as the prime location for housing Cuban rafters in August
1994. In prior litigations concerning Haitian rafters in Guantinamo, courts
had denied them legal protections." The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
had gone so far as to declare "nonsensical" the idea of recognizing a First
number between 32,000 and 33,000. See Motion for Summary Reversal, or, in the Alternative,
for an Emergency Stay Pending Appeal at 3, CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir.
1995) (stating 32,000 migrants); GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRA-
TION CRISIs, supra note 20, at 3 (stating 33,000 migrants); see also 85 Cuban Refugees Flee
Guantdnamo; 46 Are Recaptured, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1994, at 17A (stating 24,000 refu-
gees in Guantinamo and 8000 in Panamd); William Booth, U.S. Is Sued For Detaining Cuba
Refugees, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at A03 (stating 23,699 refugees in Guantinamo and
8206 in Panamg).
78 See Cubans Told They Will Return To Guantdnamo Transfer To Begin In February,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 1995, at 18A.
79 See Fabiola Santiago, No Way Out: Cubans Feel Frustrated, Forgotten, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 2, 1994, at 1A (reporting Sept. 21, 1994, information from U.S. military).
so See id.
SI GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIs, supra note 20,
at 6-7 (Defense Department expenses included "shipping food and supplies [and] transporting
military personnel"; Coast Guard expenses included "patrolling the waters between Cuba and
Florida and bringing people to Guantinamo Bay and Cuba"; and State Department expenses
included "expanding consular processing in Havana and providing a liaison officer at Guanti-
namo Bay").
82 Id. at 9; see Guantdnamo Camps Look More Permanent, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1994, at
36.
8 See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88 (1993) (permitting forced
repatriation of Haitians interdicted at sea, without providing opportunity for refugee screening)
(oral argument by CABA attorney Harold Hongju Koh); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker,
953 F.2d 1498, 1511 (11th Cir.) (finding no right of action for interdicted Haitians under
repatriation order), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker,
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Amendment right of access to Haitians in Guantinamo, as "interdicted Hai-
tians have no recognized substantive rights under the laws or Constitution of
the United States."84 So when Cuban refugees arrived at the base, the camps
were hardly empty; in addition to naval personnel, there were already
thousands of Haitian refugees under United States safe haven protection:
16,800 at the peak of the Haitian emigration in 1994.5
Like the Cuban refugees, the Haitian refugees had fled political oppres-
sion in their homeland. In 1991, the democratically elected President of Ha-
iti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a military coup and forced
into exile. Thousands of Haitians took to the sea to flee the Island and es-
cape to the United States. Following U.S. policy, the Coast Guard inter-
cepted Haitian refugees bound for the United States and returned them to
Haiti.86
In June 1994, only two months before the Cuban rafter crisis, the
United States changed its policy toward Haitian refugees. Rather than re-
turning them to Haiti, the U.S. government began processing them for asy-
lum in the United States."7 In a preview of its treatment of the Cuban
refugees, however, the government did not allow the Haitian refugees to
enter the United States directly; instead, it offered them safe haven in camps
in Guantinamo.8
On September 19, 1994, the United States led a United Nations-author-
ized military intervention in Haiti. On October 15, 1994, Aristide returned
from exile and reclaimed the presidency. Following the return of Aristide,
many Haitians in Guantinamo voluntarily repatriated to Haiti, and the num-
ber of Haitian refugees in the camps decreased to approximately 8000 by the
end of 1994.9
II. CABA: "A GRATUITOUs HUMANITARIAN ACT"
The circumstances of the Cuban refugees and their sudden en masse
arrival to join the Haitian refugees in Guantdnamo in August 1994 were not
only compelling on a human level, but also ripe for litigation as to the refu-
gees' constitutional rights. While they waited for something, anything, to
happen, a lawsuit in Miami, Florida, was fast in the making.
950 F.2d 685, 687 (11th Cir. 1991) (staying and suspending temporary restraining order
preventing repatriation of interdicted Haitians).
* Haitian Reffugee Center, Inc., 953 F.2d at 1513.
15 See GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note
20, at 9; CABA, 43 F.3d at 1419.
86 See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1419.
87 See id.
" See id.
89 See id.
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A. Relief Granted by Trial Court
Cuban-American attorneys and community leaders in Miami were
watching the rafter crisis, and many were distressed by the Clinton adminis-
tration's response. Ready to sue the U.S. government on behalf of the bal-
seros, Miami attorneys first sought direct relief from the executive branch.
On October 13, 1994, they flew to Washington, D.C., for a private meeting
with White House officials. 90 The attorneys hoped to gain access to the refu-
gees in Guantinamo and to secure their prompt release into the United
States, not back into Cuba, as was prescribed by the countries' September
9th agreement.9'
All participants in the meeting shared a long-term goal: an open and
democratic Cuba. 92 After ninety minutes, however, the discussion reached
an impasse on the short-term issue of repatriation. 3 The attorneys did not
want Cuban "refugees" to have to return to the communist land they had
fled in order to seek asylum in the United States, while the government
refused to allow the "migrants" to come directly into the United States or to
offer them an opportunity to claim asylum in Guantinamo.9 4 White House
officials refused to recognize the Cubans as detained refugees.95 The offi-
cials saw them as migrants who were not in detention but instead had chosen
to "hit" rafts rather than apply for asylum at the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana, and who were now choosing to stay in camps rather than return to
Havana for orderly processing.96 Lacking White House support, the balseros
filed suit.
1. Cuban Refugee Plaintiffs' Filing of Lawsuit
On October 24, 1994, the Cuban refugees and their attorneys filed
CABA v. Christopher as a class action in U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, seeking due process rights and access to counsel for refu-
" Memorandum from Jorge L. Hemandez-Toraio to Comm. for Freedom of Guantanamo
Detainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
9' Id.
92 See id.; accord Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (Aug. 19, 1994)
("The problems of Cuba have got to be solved there by democratic reform . . . .").
9 See Memorandum from Jorge L. Hernandez-Torailo to Comm. for Freedom of Guanta-
namo Detainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
9 Id.
9 Id.
96 Id. In what may have been a further attempt to avoid litigation, I.N.S. Commissioner
Doris Meissner offered in a letter to provide the Miami attorneys "access to the camps" and
"contact with migrants," subject to "restrictions dictated by security and operational consider-
ations." Letter from Roberto Martinez, Attorney, to Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Attor-
ney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 15, 1994) (quoting Meissner letter) (on file
with author). This olive branch-or whatever it was intended to be-failed. The same day of
Meissner's letter, the Guantinamo refugees filed their lawsuit.
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gees.Y The complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief under, inter
alia, the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 98
The Cuban American Bar Association ("CABA") is a large and suc-
cessful voluntary bar association that has been a prominent force in the
Miami legal community since its founding in 1974. Other named plaintiffs
were individual refugees in the Guantinamo camps, and their inclusion high-
lighted the personal stakes in the litigation. One plaintiff was a twelve-year-
old girl, Lizbet Martinez, who had fled Cuba in August 1994 with her par-
ents and ten other refugees on a raft.99 Martinez was a talented violinist
who played the Star-Spangled Banner for the Coast Guard, Guantinamo mil-
itary personnel, and other refugees.100
The CABA litigation was an instant sensation in the Miami media, and
stories ran nearly every day in local newspapers.' The plight of tens of
thousands of Cubans stranded in U.S.-controlled territory just south of
Miami was emotional and gripping. Increasing the emotional intensity was
the fact that the interception of these refugees at sea and their diversion to
Guantinamo reversed a decades-old policy of welcoming Cubans into the
United States-a reversal that occurred after the refugees had fled Cuba in
reliance on the open-arms policy.
* CABA v. Christopher, Case No. 94-2183-CIV-ATKINS.
* The case was initially assigned to Judge Wilkie Ferguson, who recused himself, and
then re-assigned to now-Chief Judge Federico Moreno, who also recused himself. The case
was finally re-assigned to Judge C. Clyde Atkins, who adjudicated the matter. This case was
not Judge Atkins' first significant refugee litigation, and his presiding over the CABA case bode
well for the plaintiffs at the trial level. In Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, Judge Atkins
had ruled that the First Amendment likely gave immigration lawyers the right to counsel Hai-
tians intercepted at sea. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed his rulings, holding that
constitutional rights apply only to those within U.S. borders. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.
v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992); Haitian Refu-
gee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Editorial, Judge Atkins Is
Right, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 2, 1994, at 14A.
' See Andres Viglucci, Suit Demands Freedom For Cuban Rafters Panamd, Guanidnamo
Camps Called Illegal, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 25, 1994, at lA.
I" See id.; Madeline Baro Diaz, A Star-Spangled Performance From Her Rescue From A
Raft To Her Graduation, The National Anthem Has Been Her Tune, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Dec. 17, 2003, at 1B; Liz Balmaseda, Pleading For Liberty, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 1994, at
IA. More than sixty attorneys represented the plaintiffs pro bono, including Cuban refugees
Frank Angones, who later became president of the Florida Bar Association; Marcos Jiminez,
who later served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida just after September 11,
2001; and Roberto Martinez, who had previously served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern
District of Florida. Also involved was Yale Law School professor Harold Hongju Koh, who
later became Dean and now serves as Legal Advisor in the U.S. State Department under Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton. Just before joining the CABA counsel team, Koh had argued the
case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. in the Supreme Court on behalf of Haitian refu-
gees intercepted at sea and forcibly repatriated. 509 U.S. 155 (1993); see Ardy Friedberg, Yale
Professor Leads Fight To Help Refugees, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 1, 1994, at 6A.
"0' Recognizing the media attraction to their case, the CABA attorneys prepared a list of
potential questions and answers for press conferences, highlighting the justice of their cause.
Press Conference Q&A (on file with author). They sought access to the refugees "to protect
them from coerced repatriation, to assure humane treatment while they are waiting to be
processed as refugees, and to seek an end to their indefinite detention." Id. The attorneys
were "confident that we will prevail" because "[olur cause is just and right." Id.
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In their class action, as in their attorneys' pre-litigation meeting with
White House officials, CABA plaintiffs focused on the new U.S. policy of
"coerced repatriation."l 02 Cuban refugees faced an unreasonable choice of
either staying in U.S.-controlled camps or returning to sovereign Cuba. 0 3
Repatriation must be based on informed consent, which, by definition, must
be based on information.104 But refugees held in Guantinamo and Panami
camps did not and could not know what awaited them back in Castro-con-
trolled Cuba unless they consulted with counsel.'o Accordingly, the plain-
tiffs requested that the district court grant attorneys reasonable access to
refugees for legal consultation.o6 They also requested an injunction prohib-
iting the government from repatriating or "encouraging or coercing, directly
or indirectly" the repatriation to Cuba of any refugee in Guantinamo. 0
By the date of the lawsuit, 1000 Cuban refugees in Guantinamo-out
of 33,000 total-had requested in writing to be returned home to sovereign
Cuba as soon as possible.' Others told base officials that they wanted to go
home.'09 Yet only forty-two had been repatriated because the Cuban govern-
ment had been slow to approve the list of names."10 The filing of the com-
plaint spurred action on the repatriation front. By the next morning, twenty-
three refugees who had previously volunteered for repatriation were board-
ing a plane for sovereign Cuba.
Plaintiffs moved to block all repatriations, including the government's
imminent flight. Conditions in the camps were so poor that the refugees had
been coerced into seeking repatriation: escapism rather than informed con-
sent."' One minute before the plane was scheduled to depart, CABA Judge
C. Clyde Atkins ordered the government to stop the repatriations, and the
" See id.; Class Action Complaint 54, 64-67, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 1).1o3 See Press Conference Q&A (on file with author); Class Action Complaint 1154, 64-67,
CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 1).
"N See Class Action Complaint 1 64-67, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 1).
as See id.; Administration, Lawyers Spar Over Cubans' Return, NATL L.J., Nov. 7, 1994,
at 4.
,' Class Action Complaint at 58-59, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 1).
1o7 Id.
' See Andres Viglucci, Just Let Us Go Home, 21 Cubans Ask Judge, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 28, 1994, at lA; Andres Viglucci, Judge Lifts Orders Halting Repatriations Ruling Affects
1,000 Cuban Detainees, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1994, at IA; Administration, Lawyers Spar
Over Cubans' Return, NATL L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 4; 85 Cuban Refugees Flee Guantdnamo;
46 Are Recaptured, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1994, at 17A.
'" Karen Branch, Guantdnamo Cubans' Patience Thin, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 1994, at
18A.
"
0 See Administration, Lawyers Spar Over Cubans' Return, NATL L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 4;
Andres Viglucci, Repatriation Of Rafters Is Blocked, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 26, 1994, at IA.
". Cf Class Action Complaint IT 64-67, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 1).
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flight was aborted.112 Judge Atkins also gave the attorneys "reasonable and
meaningful access" to the "detained plaintiff refugees.""'
While litigation was accelerating, tensions in the Guantinamo camps
were rising, with escape attempts and fights among the refugees.114 Several
refugees crushed fences and jumped off a forty-foot cliff into the sea, risking
their safety trying to flee back into Castro-controlled land."' The govern-
ment-recognizing that the threat of violence among frustrated refugees was
"acute"-quickly moved the Eleventh Circuit for summary reversal of
Judge Atkins' order.'16 The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court's
complete ban on repatriations, but permitted plaintiffs' attorneys to visit the
camps."' Military personnel at the base were left to run the camps while
following these changing instructions from the courts. Still, the military re-
mained aware that it was always "dealing with human stories, not just legal
principles.""
Back in the Miami courthouse, the refugees' human stories were un-
folding against the backdrop of legal principles. The Eleventh Circuit
granted plaintiffs' attorneys reasonable access to their clients in Guantinamo
and to "any other detainees" who made a written request for legal counsel;
allowed the government to repatriate "detainees who express a desire by
written declaration to be returned to sovereign Cuba"; and prohibited the
government from repatriating any who did not make that written declara-
112 See Administration, Lawyers Spar Over Cubans' Return, NATL L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 4.
CABA attorney Marcos Jimdnez described the last-minute order as "a squeaker." Juan J.
Walte, Fate Of Cuban Refugees May Be Decided Today, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 26, 1994, at 1A;
see Andres Viglucci, Repatriation Flights To Cuba Stay Grounded, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 27,
1994, at 21A. After later court orders, twenty-two of the twenty-three Cuban refugees origi-
nally on board took another flight out of Guantinamo and repatriated. Somehow-on foot or
by swimming-the missing passenger had escaped his camp. See Lawyers Fly To Guantd-
namo To Gather Evidence, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 1994, at 12A; 85 Cuban Refugees Flee
Guantdnamo; 46 Are Recaptured, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1994, at 17A.
11 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 13,
CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 44).
14 See 85 Cuban Refugees Flee Guantdnamo; 46 Are Recaptured, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
7, 1994, at 17A; Andres Viglucci, Judge Lifts Orders Halting Repatriations Ruling Affects
1,000 Cuban Detainees, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1994, at lA; Karen Branch, Guantdnamo
Cubans' Patience Thin, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 1994, at 18A.
"5 See 85 Cuban Refugees Flee Guantdnamo; 46 Are Recaptured, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
7, 1994, at 17A; Andres Viglucci, Judge Lifts Orders Halting Repatriations Ruling Affects
1,000 Cuban Detainees, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1994, at IA. One military commander be-
came so frustrated by the unrest and danger that he moved his camps closer to the sovereign
Cuba border, thereby making escape attempts safer. See Joanne Cavanaugh, Guantdnamo De-
tainees Divided Over Lawsuits Some Cubans Don't Want The Help; They Want To Go Home,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 3, 1994, at lA.
116 Motion for Summary Reversal, or, in the Alternative, for an Emergency Stay Pending
Appeal at 7, CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Declaration of Jay
LaRoche, Field Office Director, Miami Operations of the Community Relations Service); see
also Andres Viglucci, Judge Lifts Orders Halting Repatriations Ruling Affects 1,000 Cuban
Detainees, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 4, 1994, at lA.
"' Order by the Court at 2, CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
"8 Telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011).
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tion.119 Although the court lifted Judge Atkins' complete ban on repatria-
tions, it maintained the ban for the vast majority of refugees.
The same day the Eleventh Circuit issued its order permitting visits to
the camps, plaintiffs' attorneys flew from South Florida to Guantinamo
Bay.'20 The U.S. government imposed restrictions on all such counsel vis-
its.121 For each trip, a handful of attorneys could stay on the base for only
two days, and the military bused in refugees from the camps to base of-
fices.122 Attorneys met refugees in musty rooms with poor lighting and weak
fans for ventilation.'23 The attorneys complained that, on several occasions,
the military delayed scheduled meetings with refugees or failed to produce
the refugees altogether.124 One attorney's impression upon landing in Guan-
tinamo was that the refugee area "looked like a concentration camp, with
towers and flood lights." 25
The visits proceeded nonetheless, and the attorneys interviewed as
many refugees as they could in whatever space the military provided.126
They aimed to gather evidence showing that repatriations were coerced and
" Order by the Court at 2, CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
120 See Lawyers Fly To Guantdnamo To Gather Evidence, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 1994,
at 12A. The planes were provided by Brothers to the Rescue ("Hermanos al Rescate"), which
describes itself as a "U.S.-based organization supporting through active nonviolence the ef-
forts of the Cuban people to free themselves from dictatorship." Brothers to the Rescue web-
site, available at http://www.hermanos.org/.
121 See, e.g., Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Harris to CABA attorneys (Nov. 16, 1994)
(denying access to refugee camps) (on file with author); Letter from Roberto Martinez to Seth
Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 15, 1994)
(complaining that government had denied attorneys access to refugee camps) (on file with
author); Letter from Roberto Martinez to Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 22, 1994) (reiterating complaints and requesting access) (on
file with author).
122 See Orlando J. Cabrera, Attorney, Memorandum re: Diary of Events at the United
States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba November 7 to November 10, 1994 (Nov. 13,
1994) (describing visit to base) (on file with author); Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Harris to
CABA attorneys (Nov. 16, 1994) (describing office space) (on file with author).
123 See Orlando J. Cabrera, Attorney, Memorandum re: Diary of Events at the United
States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba November 7 to November 10, 1994 (Nov. 13,
1994) (on file with author); Notes of Marcos Jimdnez, Attorney (on file with author).
'" See Orlando J. Cabrera, Attorney, Memorandum re: Diary of Events at the United
States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba November 7 to November 10, 1994 (Nov. 13,
1994) ("it bothered me that they were never brought to us despite two assurances that they
would be") (on file with author); Salvador G. Longoria, Summary re: Visit to Guantinamo,
November 21-23, 2004 (noting that attorneys were "not brought any refugees for approxi-
mately two hours") (on file with author); cf Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Harris to CABA
attorneys (Nov. 16, 1994) (explaining potential "delays in providing the persons who have
asked to see you") (on file with author).
125 Interview with Marcos Jiminez, Attorney, Kasowitz Benson Torres & Friedman, in
Miami, Fla. (July 26, 2011).
126 On November 16, 1994, Frank Angones, Marcos Jim6nez, and five other plaintiffs'
attorneys traveled from Fort Lauderdale to Guantinamo Bay on Air Sunshine, a small private
carrier offering daily flights to the naval base. On board was Marcos Jim6nez' younger
brother, Frank, an attorney who had studied at Yale Law School under Dean Koh and later
became General Counsel of the Navy-with command over Guantinamo Bay.
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that all 33,000 refugees deserved direct entry into the United States.2 7 So
began a series of extraordinary interviews and writings in Guantgnamo.
Throughout November and December 1994, thousands of Cuban refu-
gees signed requests for legal advice and representation.'28 The requests
were both formal and emotional, completing the business of requesting
counsel while striving to convey the desperation of detention.'29 Many refu-
gees were skilled laborers and professionals-licensed in economics,
mechanics, geography, history, and civil engineering's 0-but all were bal-
seros in their minds and in formal documents. One refugee, Jestis Blanco
Caraballo, had fled Castro's Cuba after being detained in Brisas del Mar, a
scenic beach town just west of Havana. Translated as "Sea Breezes," the
name of this detention location provides a poignant metaphor for freedom.' 3 '
These thousands of papers are richly descriptive of the refugees' lives in
Cuba, reasons for leaving, and hopes for freedom in the United States.
Many requests include a clear statement of why the refugees fled: to escape
the oppression of the Castro regime. As one refugee explained, "I left Cuba
because of the Cuban government authorities."'32 Other requests include a
blunt statement of what they sought in the United States: ". . . I was in
search of freedom."' 3
In their requests for counsel, many balseros also explained why the
choice the U.S. government offered-either stay in Guantinamo or repatri-
ate to Cuba-put them in an impossible position. As former officials or
dissidents under Castro's regime, some feared persecution upon repatriation.
One refugee was a "member of the Ministry of the Interior" and "for that
reason, there is no way I can return to my country."13 4 Another described
the "political persecution" he suffered, writing that "[in Cuba I am forced
by the police chief to throw myself in a raft because I do not agree with the
" See Lawyers Fly To Guantdnamo To Gather Evidence, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 1994,
at 12A. The attorneys found it difficult to "remain unemotional and/or merely factual when
recounting the experiences of Guantinamo." Salvador G. Longoria, Summary re: Visit to
Guantinamo, November 21-23, 2004 (on file with author).
128 Counsel requests of Guantinamo refugees ("Solicitud para Asesorfa Legal" or "Peti-
ci6n de Representacidn Jurfdica") (copies on file with author).
'
2 9 See id.
130 Counsel Request of Guantinamo refugees (Nov. 30, 1994) ("Lic. Economia," "Ing.
Mecdnico," "Lic. Geograffa," "Lic. Historia," "Ing. Civil") (on file with author). These
professional titles appear in a request handwritten on yellow paper from Camp India, followed
by a list of nearly 200 names and signatures. The request is signed "in 'Guantinamo Bay'
Cuba. Territory of the United States."
"' Letter from Jestis Blanco Caraballo, Guantinamo refugee, to CABA attorneys ("Es-
timado Abogado") (Dec. 30, 1994) (on file with author).
132 Counsel Request of Mario Luis Fernandez Martinez, Guantinamo refugee No. 001
036 284 (1994) ("Yo deseo ser defendido y entrevistado por un abogado Cubano-Americano
de Miami. *Viaje de Cuba por causa de las autoridades del gobierno cubano.") (on file with
author).
'3 Counsel Request from Hector Medina Diaz, Guantinamo refugee No 000 833 057, to
Osvaldo Soto, attorney (1994) ("ya que salf en busca de libertad") (on file with author).
1 Counsel Request from Hector Medina Diaz, Guantinamo refugee No 000 833 057, to
Osvaldo Soto, attorney (1994) ("miembro del Ministerio del Interior"; "por lo cual le
comunico que no puedo regresar a mi pafs") (on file with author).
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politics of Castro."' Castro's warm pledge that he would receive home all
Guantinamo refugees without reprisals, while apparently acceptable to the
United States, did nothing to comfort the refugees who had lived under his
regime.
Most poignant, many refugees wrote of their distress and bewilderment
at their current detention by U.S. officials: "They have locked me up like a
vulgar delinquent, which I am not ... I do not understand this brutal incar-
ceration and I do not know how long I can stand it."136 They sought repre-
sentation to obtain relief from the United States' own "violation of human
rights."' 37 One request, written in flowing script, invokes basic human
rights, decrying this "betrayal of human principles.""' The refugees also
expressed concern that, while they waited "locked up" in Guantinamo
camps, detainees who committed felony crimes were rumored to be trans-
ferred to the United States and prosecuted under domestic laws.'39
Despite the accumulation of written requests for counsel and the Elev-
enth Circuit's order permitting refugee visits, CABA attorneys continued to
encounter resistance at the base. The government insisted on keeping attor-
neys in base offices and busing in refugees for interviews, and it made no
secret of its position: "You will not be granted access to the camps." 40 Un-
deterred, the attorneys traveled to Guantinamo for several more months, in-
terviewing refugees and gathering evidence for the lawsuit.
2. Intervention of Haitian Refugee Plaintiffs
On October 31, 1994, one week after CABA plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint, attorneys from the Haitian Refugee Center representing the 12,000
0 Counsel Request of Raul Daniel Arenas, Guantinamo refugee No. 000 048 346 (1994)
("un perseguido politico"; "en Cuba fui obligado por el jefe de la policfa a tirame [sic] en
una balsa por no estar de acuerdo con la politica de Castro") (on file with author).
06 Counsel Request from Hector Medina Diaz, Guantinamo refugee No 000 833 057, to
Osvaldo Soto, attorney (1994) ("me han encerrado como un vulgar delincuente, lo cual no
soy.... No entiendo este brutal encierro y no s6 hasta d6nde podr6 soportarlo.") (on file with
author).
'" Counsel Request of Luis Martinez Leon, Guantinamo refugee No. 000575561, Jose A.
Martinez Belsuzardo, Guantdnamo refugee No. 000 529 858, and Mario L. Fernandez Marti-
nez, Guantinamo refugee No. 001036284 (1994) ("violaci6n de los derechos humanos") (on
file with author).
"' Letter from Heriberto Caballero Ponciano, Ingeniero Industrial and "Refugiado (sin
status)," to CABA attorneys (Dec. 1, 1994) ("traici6n a los principios de la humanidad") (on
file with author).
139 Counsel Request from Hector Medina Diaz, Guantinamo refugee No 000 833 057, to
Osvaldo Soto, attorney (1994) (on file with author); see Orlando J. Cabrera, Attorney, Memo-
randum re: Diary of Events at the United States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba No-
vember 7 to November 10, 1994 (Nov. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
" Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Harris to CABA attorneys (Nov. 16, 1994) (on file with
author); accord Letter from Roberto Martinez to Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with author); Letter from Roberto
Martinez to Seth Waxman, Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
(Nov. 22, 1994) (on file with author).
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Haitians in Guantinamo successfully moved to intervene in the litigation.141
In addition to permitting intervention, Judge Atkins granted the Haitian Ref-
ugee Center access to the Haitian plaintiffs in Guantinamo and to "any other
Haitian detainees who request counsel in writing"; ordered Attorney General
Reno to parole from safe haven unaccompanied Haitian minors in the same
manner as unaccompanied Cuban minors; and ordered the U.S. government
to provide the names of Haitian detainees.142
The Haitian Refugee Center injected a new constitutional claim in the
litigation: a Fifth Amendment equal protection violation on the basis that
Haitian children in Guantinamo camps were being treated less favorably
than Cuban children.143 It claimed that the Attorney General could not pa-
role Cuban unaccompanied minors into the United States while leaving Hai-
tian unaccompanied minors to languish in camps.'"
Judge Atkins subsequently stayed his order, but still permitted the Hai-
tian Refugee Center access to any Haitian refugees who requested legal
counsel.145 The government appealed, and on December 1, 1994, the Elev-
enth Circuit consolidated the cases. Four months into the Cuban rafter crisis,
the appellate court now had control of the entire matter.
B. Relief Denied on Appeal
On January 18, 1995, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion. Signifi-
cantly, the court described the Cuban and Haitian refugees as "migrants"
"temporarily provided safe haven" in Guantinamo and their "residency"
conditions as "difficult" yet hopeful, fortified by the "concern" of pro bono
attorneys and the "goodwill" of "military rescuers and caretakers."14 6 This
language was a break from that used at the trial level, as Judge Atkins' orders
had consistently described the Cubans and Haitians in Guantdnamo as de-
tained refugees.147 Yet, the language was consistent with that used by White
House officials: Cubans in Guantinamo were not refugees in detention; they
"' See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1420.
142 Order on Provisional Intervenors' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2,
CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 1994) (No. 143).
143 See 43 F.3d at 1427.
'"See id.
1 Omnibus Order at 3, CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
146 43 F.3d at 1430.
147 See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Or-
der at 4, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 44) ("The
issue is whether the detained plaintiff refugees . . . are entitled to advice of counsel to assure
their 'voluntary' decision to repatriate.").
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were always free to leave.' 48 And it foreshadowed the result on appeal. The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, denying the refugees constitutional rights.149
The Eleventh Circuit considered three issues: (1) "[w]hether the Cuban
or Haitian migrants in safe haven outside the physical borders of the United
States have any cognizable statutory or constitutional rights," including due
process; (2) whether the attorneys have a First Amendment right to free as-
sociation, such that the U.S. government must allow access to the camps;
and (3) whether the Haitian refugees have equal protection rights and the
Haitian Refugee Center has a First Amendment right to free association.'s
The key to all these issues was the assertion of constitutional rights on behalf
of the refugees, individuals who were not U.S. citizens and who were
outside U.S. borders. Any rights of the attorneys would be predicated on
those underlying claims, as the Eleventh Circuit had previously held that a
lawyer's First Amendment right to associate with a client is narrow and "is
predicated upon the existence of an underlying legal claim that may be as-
serted by the potential litigant."'"' The government's litigation position was
succinct: "the people, the Cubans who are in safe haven at Guantinamo, are
without rights under our Constitution." 5 2
The Eleventh Circuit dissolved Judge Atkins' preliminary injunction,
finding that the Cuban and Haitian plaintiffs could not show a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits."' Put simply, the court held that these
"migrants in safe haven outside the physical borders of the United States"
had no "cognizable statutory or constitutional rights." 5 4
Analyzing the legal nature of Guantinamo Bay, the Eleventh Circuit
found that, although the United States exercises perpetual control and juris-
diction over Guantdnamo, it was not U.S. territory nor "functionally
' See Memorandum from Jorge L. Hernandez-Toraflo to Comm. for Freedom of Guanta-
namo Detainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author); cf Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Class Certification at 1, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2,
1994) (No. 85) (CABA complaint "challeng[es] the government's actions surrounding the al-
leged detention and forced repatriation of Cuban migrants").
149 43 F.3d at 1417, 1430.
1s0 Id. at 1421.
'5' See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 953 F.2d at 1513; see also CABA, 43 F.3d at 1429.
152 Transcript of Hearing on Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 73, CABA v.
Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 1994) (No. 26) (statement of Allen W. Haus-
man, Chief, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation). The
phrase, "in safe haven at Guantdnamo," was key to the government's position and underscored
the unusual legal nature of the naval base outside U.S. borders. Within U.S. borders, non-U.S.
citizens enjoy considerable constitutional rights. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12
(1982) (applying Equal Protection Clause to illegal immigrants and recognizing that Four-
teenth Amendment provisions "'are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction'") (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (applying Fifth Amendment protections from federal government
discrimination to illegal immigrants); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)
(finding resident alien is a Fifth Amendment "person"); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148
(1945) (finding resident aliens have First Amendment rights).
'5 43 F.3d at 1424.
4 Id. at 1430.
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equivalent" to land within U.S. borders.'15 Extending prior case decisions
denying rights to Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas, the Eleventh
Circuit did not allow these new refugees in Guantinamo to invoke due pro-
cess or any other constitutional or statutory protections.1 16
The court addressed the constitutional questions grudgingly, apparently
hoping to avoid them altogether, but finding itself forced to address (and
dispense with) such questions "urged upon us" by plaintiffs' inability to in-
voke statutory rights.' 7 These questions arose in the context of plaintiffs'
claim of a Fifth Amendment "due process right to obtain and communicate
with legal counsel of their choice regarding asylum application or parole in
order to protect an interest against being wrongly repatriated from safe ha-
ven."1"8 The Eleventh Circuit observed that one of its sister courts-the
Second Circuit in Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary'l59-had recently
found that, when the government "screens in" a migrant to determine if that
person is a refugee, such "screening in" creates a liberty interest to which
due process attaches.6 0 The Eleventh Circuit, however, declined to take a
position on the possibility of such due process attachment for the Cuban and
Haitian "migrants" in Guantinamo.' 6' The court's position in any event
would have been dicta, as the court found that no screening had occurred.162
Rather, the Clinton administration had made the strategic decision not to
offer preliminary refugee determination interviews.' 63 Whatever processing
had occurred when the migrants were brought to Guantinamo, it was distinct
from "screening." "
According to the Eleventh Circuit, all the U.S. government had done
was act graciously, as a privileged host moved by noblesse oblige to wel-
come in one less fortunate than himself: "[p]roviding safe haven residency
is a gratuitous humanitarian act which does not in any way create even the
putative liberty interest in securing asylum processing that the Second Cir-
cuit found that initial screening creates." 65 The mere act of "bringing the
migrants to safe haven" did not give rise to "any protectable liberty or prop-
* Id. at 1425.
' Id.; see Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88; Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 953 F.2d at 1511-13;
Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 950 F.2d at 687.
1' 43 F.3d at 1425 ("Because the Cuban Legal Organizations and HRC [Haitian Refugee
Center] struggle to re-assert statutory claims foreclosed by HRC II and Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. and fail to assert new meritorious statutory claims, we reach the constitutional
issues as well.") (internal citation omitted).
58 Id. at 1426.
15 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated as moot sub nom., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993).
'6 43 F.3d at 1427.
161 See id.
162 Id.
161 Id. at 1426.164 Id. at 1427.
165 Id. (emphasis added). There is a common law argument, at least, for reasonable treat-
ment when gratuitously undertaking the humanitarian task of receiving and sheltering an indi-
vidual on one's land. See, e.g., 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hotels, Motels, Etc. § 70 (2011) (hotel that
undertakes to protect and give aid to guests has a duty to exercise reasonable care).
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erty interest against being wrongly repatriated."1 66 These "migrants" could
be shipped home tomorrow without due process protection or recourse, if
ever the government chose to act in a less gratuitous or less humanitarian
fashion.'16 Without due process protection, the "migrants" had no basis on
which to "rest a claim of right of counsel and information." 68
The Eleventh Circuit applied a similar analysis to the Haitian minors'
claim of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.169 The court held that
the children had no Fifth Amendment rights to challenge the government's
exercise of parole discretion or any other decision.7 0 Noting that the Su-
preme Court had previously declined to apply the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments extraterritorially in United States v. Verdugo- Urquidezn' and Johnson
v. Eisentrager,172 respectively, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "aliens
who are outside the United States cannot claim rights to enter or be paroled
into the United States based on the Constitution." 73
Thus, the Cuban and Haitian refugees in Guantinamo and Panami
camps were judicially declared to be migrants standing outside U.S. territory
"without legal rights that are cognizable in the United States." 74 In the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion, there is little mention of hardship in the refugee
camps. Rather, while nodding in the direction of "difficult conditions,""'
the court described a "safe haven" in the true sense of that phrase: a place of
refuge or security.176 Just as White House officials had told CABA plaintiffs
before litigation, the U.S. government did not want to "maintain these mi-
grants for an indefinite period of time or against their will."' 7 And in the
Eleventh Circuit's view, the migrants had real options. They could stay in
safe haven, voluntarily repatriate to Cuba and seek asylum in the United
States through appropriate channels, or settle in a welcoming third coun-
try.17  The migrants were "beneficiaries of the American tradition of hu-
manitarian concern and conduct," receiving the military's "goodwill" to
"hopefully sustain and reassure them in their quest for a better life."' 9 In
166 43 F.3d at 1427.
167 See id. at 1427, 1429-30.
'
6 Id. at 1427.
'
6 9 See id. at 1427-29.
o
7 0 Id. at 1429.
1' 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990) (rejecting Fourth Amendment rights over search and
seizure by United States agents of Mexican citizen's property in Mexico).
172 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) (rejecting Fifth Amendment rights for German nationals who
had been convicted in China of activities against the United States and repatriated to Germany
for imprisonment).
7 43 F.3d at 1428-29.
74 Id. at 1430.
1' Id.
"6 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DiCrIONARY, Entry for "haven" (2011), available at http:/
/www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/haven.
177 43 F.3d at 1418; see Memorandum from Jorge L. Hernandez-Torafio to Comm. for
Freedom of Guantanamo Detainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
I7l43 F.3d at 1418.
1
79 Id. at 1430.
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the end, the solution to the migrants' problem was better "addressed by the
legislative and executive branches."s 0
The CABA appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court denied
their petition for writ of certiorari.' The refugees were left to seek help
outside the court system, which they ultimately did by obtaining parole as an
appropriate outcome in the political sphere.18 2
That was Guantinamo in the mid-1990s. Then things changed, and
later Guantinamo lawsuits provided a new lens revealing CABA as an appro-
priate outcome in the judicial sphere.
III. PosT-9/1 1: ENEMY COMBATANTS IN GUANT&NAMO
In the early 2000s, everything changed. We were attacked on U.S. soil
on September 11, 2001. President Bush launched the War on Terror. U.S.
military forces invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. soldiers captured indi-
viduals in those and other foreign countries, and the Bush administration
labeled them "unlawful enemy combatants."' 3 Military officials brought
these enemy combatants to Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, and detained them in
prisons. We entered a new historical moment, which introduced a new judi-
cial outlook on familiar constitutional issues.
The courts' analysis of Guantinamo detainees became infused with
post-9/11 sentiment and shifted from looking at where the detainees were to
casting a critical eye on who they were. No longer were "migrants" fleeing
oppressive homelands hoping to reach the United States for freedom and
choosing temporary residence in Guantinamo camps. Now the naval base
held enemy combatants captured in war zones who sought to kill Americans
and destroy the very idea of America as a symbol of Western values, moder-
nity, and freedom.
One might think that this shift in hostilities would solidify the lack of
rights for Guantinamo detainees. The government apparently thought so, as
it transferred foreigners apprehended abroad to a U.S.-controlled area that
had been declared in CABA to be beyond constitutional reach for non-U.S.
citizens.18 4 There was no reason to think that this new group of captives
arriving in Guantinamo would be treated differently. After all, why grant
iso Id.
' CABA v. Christopher, 516 U.S. 913 (1995).
182 See discussion infra Section V.
183 See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) ("(A) The term 'unlawful enemy combatant' means-(i) a
person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostil-
ities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant
(including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person
who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secre-
tary of Defense."); see also Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Order Establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) at 1.
-8 See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1424-25, 1430.
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enemy combatants constitutional rights when refugees had been denied those
rights? Yet, the Supreme Court did just that.
A. Boumediene: "Designated as Enemy Combatants and Detained"
On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court decided Boumediene v. Bush and
held that certain constitutional protections, specifically the writ of habeas
corpus under the Suspension Clause, do apply to enemy combatants detained
in Guantinamo.ss As an emblem of British legal history, the writ of habeas
corpus long predates the U.S. Constitution and indeed came into being to
enforce the promises of the Magna Carta.'86 The Suspension Clause protects
this ancient writ, providing that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
sion the public Safety may require it.""' Any withdrawal of the constitu-
tional privilege of habeas corpus must conform to this clause. While the
CABA had invoked Fifth Amendment Due Process rather than the Suspen-
sion Clause, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in sweeping fashion that they
lacked "cognizable . . . constitutional rights."' 8 Even limiting Boumediene
to habeas corpus relief, the case serves as a guide on the larger question of
the Constitution's reach to Guantinamo, which had been denied in CABA.
Boumediene continued a series of Guantinamo detainee cases that the
Supreme Court had been deciding in rapid succession since the attacks of
September 11, 2001. The transformation of the Guantinamo Bay naval base
pressed these cases upon the Court. Soon after the attacks, the U.S. military
opened prisons in Guantinamo specifically to hold alleged terrorists, many
of whom were suspected to be members of al Qaeda and the Taliban.59
Over the following few years, the base held nearly 800 prisoners.'90 By the
85 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
18 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218-19 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since
John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed,
or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."); BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 322 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (habeas corpus writ is "employed to bring a person before a
court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not illegal").
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
8843 F.3d at 1421; see id. at 1430. The interplay between the Due Process and Suspen-
sion Clauses is a topic of recent and interesting commentary. See Joshua Alexander Geltzer,
Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantdnamo: The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After
Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, U. PENN. J.
CONsT. L. (forthcoming).
89 See Walter Pincus, Powell Calls for Closure of Military Prison at Guantdnamo, WASH.
POST, Jun. 11, 2007, at A03.
i9 See Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), N.Y. THmW-s, Apr. 25, 2011, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/nationallusstatesterritoriesandpossessions/guantanamobay
navalbasecubalindex.html?scp= 1-spot&sq= guantanamo%20bay%20naval%20base&st= cse
("Of the 779 people who have been detained at the United States military prison at Guanti-
namo, 600 have been transferred and 171 remain . . . .").
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end of 2008, just after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Boumediene,
Guantdnamo held approximately 250 prisoners.191
The scale of the detainee population was significantly smaller than a
decade prior, during the balseros crisis that saw 33,000 Cuban rafters de-
scend on Guantinamo. But detention was more difficult for the obvious
reason that prisons had replaced tent camps. Enemy combatant prisoners
were alone in windowless cells, and several launched hunger strikes and
attempted suicide."' Confinement conditions pushed many "to the edge,"
according to Amnesty International.193 Unlike migrant camps built amid the
small-town feel of downtown Guantinamo, the prisons were isolated and
distant. While the White House and the military viewed the housing of raft-
ers as humanitarian and voluntary, they viewed these post-9/11 detentions as
"decidedly not humanitarian."l9 4 They were also decidedly not voluntary.
The military now had a law enforcement function.195
Facing a new, urgent set of unlawful imprisonment claims from Guan-
tdnamo, the Supreme Court quickly carved out a new line of detainee juris-
prudence, notably protective of the detainees and irritating to Congress. On
the same day in 2004, the Court decided both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld9 6 and
Rasul v. Bush,'97 predecessors to Boumediene and landmark decisions in the
Court's emerging post-9/11 case law.
Hamdi presented the strongest case for constitutional protections, as the
petitioner was a U.S. citizen held on U.S. soil.' 9 Yaser Esam Hamdi had
been captured in Afghanistan as an enemy combatant fighting for the
Taliban and transferred from Guantinamo to naval brigs in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, and Charleston, South Carolina.19 9 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme
Court ruled that the government could detain a U.S. citizen apprehended in a
foreign country as an enemy combatant.200 In a near-unanimous opinion, the
Court further held that such a detainee must be given at least minimal due
process. Specifically, "a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classifica-
tion as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
... News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense (Public Affairs), Detainee Transfer Announced (Dec. 16, 2008).
102 See Josh White, Guantdnamo Desperation Seen in Suicide Attempts; One Incident Was
During Lawyer's Visit, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at A01.
' Guantdnamo Conditions 'Worsening', BBC NEWS, April 4, 2007, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6526589.stm.
194 E-mail from Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners, to author (July 17, 2011) (on file
with author).
" Southern Command Joint Task Force-Guantinamo joined the naval base after 9/11 "to
accomplish detainee operations in the War on Terror." United States Navy Fact File, Naval
Station Guantinamo Bay, Cuba (Nov. 8, 2011).
96 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
'97 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
'9 542 U.S. at 510. Petitioner Hamdi's father filed the writ of habeas corpus on his be-
half. The contrast between Hamdi and CABA is particularly stark, as the CABA plaintiffs were
neither U.S. citizens, nor on U.S. soil, nor enemy combatants.
199 Id.
20 Id. at 519 ("There is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy
combatant.").
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classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual asser-
tions before a neutral decisionmaker." 20 1
Rasul raised more difficult questions, as petitioners were neither U.S.
citizens nor detained on U.S. soil. Rather, petitioners were foreign nationals
who had been captured abroad in battles between U.S. forces and the Taliban
and later detained in Guantinamo prisons. 20 2 Invoking the federal habeas
statute,203 they sought judicial review of their detention.20 4 The D.C. District
Court dismissed the cases, holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to
hear such habeas petitions. 205 Following the Eleventh Circuit's lead, the trial
court noted that "Cuban American Bar Association stands for the proposi-
tion that the military base at Guantinamo Bay is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States simply because the United States exercises
jurisdiction and control over that facility." 206 The D.C. Circuit Court af-
firmed dismissal and also relied on CABA, observing that "[t]he Eleventh
Circuit there rejected the argument-which the detainees make in this
case-that with respect to Guantanamo Bay 'control and jurisdiction' is
equivalent to sovereignty."2 07
The Supreme Court in Rasul reversed, holding that the Guantinamo
detainees did have statutory entitlement to habeas review.20 s The Court
based its holding on the "exclusive jurisdiction and control" of the United
States over Guantinamo, the petitioners' lack of any proceeding or process,
and the fact that petitioners sought a statutory rather than constitutional
"right to federal habeas review." 20 9 The high court ignored the lower courts'
reliance on CABA, omitting any citation to the case.
Congress responded to Rasul by passing the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from
Guantinamo prisoners. 210 The following year, the Supreme Court in
20! Id. at 533; see also id. at 538-39 (remanding for determination of specific due process
requirements). Only Justice Thomas dissented on this point.
202 As in Hamdi, petitioners' parents filed the Rasul litigation: the father of an Australian
detainee, the father of a British detainee, and the mother of another British detainee. See Al
Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136-37. By the time of the Supreme Court's decision, the petitioners held
in Guantinamo comprised two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens. See Rasul, 542
U.S. at 470. Lead Petitioner Shafiq Rasul was a British citizen who had been repatriated to the
United Kingdom a few months earlier; British authorities released him without charge. See id.
at 470-71 n.1.
203 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (granting federal district courts authority to hear habeas
corpus applications by any person "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States").
204 542 U.S. at 475.
205 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57, 73 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd sub nom., Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004).
206 Id. at 72.
207 321 F.3d at 1143, 1145.
208 542 U.S. at 483-84. The Supreme Court found that "[n]o party questions" that the
district court could exercise jurisdiction over the Guantinamo detainees' custodians, which was
sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id.
209 Id. at 476, 478.
210 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 199 Stat. 2680 (2005).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruled that this Act did not apply retroactively to peti-
tions already pending.211 Accordingly, the Court heard the habeas appeal in
front of it from petitioner Salim Ahmed Hamdan.2 12 Hamdan was a Yemeni
citizen captured in Afghanistan whom the government determined to be a
member of al Qaeda engaged in terrorist activities, including serving as
Osama bin Laden's bodyguard and driver. 2 13 President Bush had ordered
that Hamdan's case, along with a handful of other detainees' cases, be tried
in Guantinamo by a military tribunal, with the appointment of military
counsel. 214 Hamdan filed a habeas petition challenging the lawfulness of this
tribunal. 215 The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan's favor, finding that the
Bush administration's convening of military commissions was neither au-
thorized by congressional act, nor consistent with the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, nor in harmony with the Geneva Convention.216 It appeared at
this point that the Guantinamo detainees could look to the federal courts for
relief.
Congress quickly responded by passing the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, again stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions
from enemy combatants in Guantinamo 217 but making clear that the Act
applied to petitions "pending on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of detention of an alien detained by the United States since Sep-
tember 11, 2001.1"218 This "ongoing dialogue between and among the
branches of Government" set the stage for Boumediene.2 19
Two years later, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court recognized the
Guantinamo detainees' right under the Constitution to assert habeas
corpus.2 20 The Court continued its streak of extending legal protections in
arguably the weakest case for relief: application of constitutional habeas
privileges to non-U.S. citizens captured and detained outside U.S. borders.
The opinion opens with a telling line: "Petitioners are aliens designated as
enemy combatants and detained at the United States Naval Station at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba."221 Immediately, with the phrase, "designated as enemy
combatants and detained," the judiciary recognized a distinct world from the
211 548 U.S. 557, 583-84 (2006) ("There is nothing absurd about a scheme under which
pending habeas actions-particularly those, like this one, that challenge the very legitimacy of
the tribunals whose judgments Congress would like to have reviewed-are preserved . . . .").
212 Id. Petitioner Hamdan later filed an amicus curiae brief in the Boumediene case.
213 Id. at 568.
214 Id. at 569.
215 Id. at 567.
216 Id. at 567, 594-95, 624-25, 635.
217 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (Supp. 2007) (No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus .
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2631, § 7(b) (2006).
219 553 U.S. at 738.220 See id. at 771.
221 Id. at 732.
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mid-1990s world of "migrants" "temporarily provided safe haven."222 That
distinction made the difference.
The Boumediene petitioners were foreign citizens allegedly fighting
against the United States and captured in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Gambia, and
elsewhere. 23 The lead petitioner, Lakhdar Boumediene, was an Algerian na-
tional who had immigrated to Bosnia.224 In October 2001, Bosnian police
arrested Boumediene and five other Algerians for plotting to attack the U.S.
embassy in Sarajevo.225 The Bosnian court released them all for lack of evi-
dence. 226 The police then re-arrested these individuals and handed them over
to the U.S. military, which transferred them to Guantinamo. 27
Like hundreds of others, these foreign citizens were detained in Guantd-
namo military prisons. While the prisoners could not initiate legal chal-
lenges to their detention in U.S. courts, they were subject to annual reviews
by a military panel.228 The Supreme Court had recognized in Hamdi that
"the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal
agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war.'" 2 29 In the wake
of that decision, the Department of Defense established Combatant Status
Review Tribunals ("CSRTs") to determine whether Guantinamo detainees
were in fact enemy combatants. 23 0 A CSRT determined that the petitioners
in Boumediene were all enemy combatants, 23 1 and thus all sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ordered dismissal on the
basis that "[f]ederal courts have no jurisdiction in these cases." 23 2 The Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006 had stripped the courts of jurisdiction to hear
habeas applications by any alien "detained as an enemy combatant," and the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provided alternative procedures for review
of a detainee's status. 233 Analyzing the legal nature of Guantinamo Bay, the
court cited, inter alia, CABA for the proposition that "Cuba-not the United
States-has sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay." 234 Analyzing the history of
how the Suspension Clause protected the habeas writ "as it existed in 1789,"
the court then took a clear view against the detainees by finding precedent
"that the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or
222 See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1417.
223 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
224 Lakhdar Boumediene, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, available at http://topics.nytimes.
corn/top/reference/ timestopics /people/blakhdar boumediene/index.html ?scp = 1-spot&sq=
lakhdar%20boumediene&st=cse.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
229 542 U.S. at 518 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
230 See 553 U.S. at 723.
231 Id.
232 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
233 Id.
234 Id. at 992.
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presence within the United States." 235 The detainees appealed, claiming that
the Military Commissions Act violated the Suspension Clause and effected
an unconstitutional withdrawal of their right to habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court on appeal considered two potential bars to the
Guantinamo detainees' invocation of the Suspension Clause: (1) "their sta-
tus, i.e., petitioners' designation by the Executive Branch as enemy combat-
ants"; and (2) "their physical location, i.e., their presence at Guantanamo
Bay." 236 Note the order: first status, then location. The Court's primary con-
cern was who the detainees were rather than where they were.
Indeed, the Supreme Court gave less attention to location than prior
heated discussions might have forecasted. Now the extraterritoriality of
Guantinamo was simply accepted as given; the Court did "not question the
Government's position that Cuba, not the United States, maintains sover-
eignty, in the legal and technical sense of the term, over Guantanamo Bay.
But this does not end the analysis."237 Rather, the Court viewed sovereignty
as a "multifaceted concept,"238 and it distinguished between de jure sover-
eignty-which Cuba kept under the 1903 Lease Agreement-and de facto
sovereignty-which the United States held "by virtue of its complete juris-
diction and control over the base." 23 9 The United States' "complete jurisdic-
tion and control" over Guantinamo, rather than "legal and technical"
sovereignty, proved sufficient to support constitutional guarantees even for
non-U.S. citizens detained on non-U.S. soil.240
Adopting a "functional approach" as to the reach of the Constitution,
and relying on "practical considerations" from earlier decisions in Johnson
v. Eisentrager2 41 and the Insular Cases,2 42 the Supreme Court refused to al-
low the executive branch to "switch the Constitution on and off' by invok-
ing another country's de jure sovereignty over territory the United States
governs. 243 With respect to enemy combatants detained in Guantinamo in
particular, the Court examined "(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee
and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took
place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's enti-
235 Id. at 988, 991.
236 553 U.S. at 739.
237 Id. at 754.
23s Id. at 763.
239 Id. at 755.
240 The Court drove home the point, calling the United States' control over the Guanti-
namo naval station "absolute" and "indefinite." Id. at 768.
241 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see discussion infra Section IV.A.
242 In several opinions from the early 1900s, collectively known as the Insular Cases be-
cause they concerned islands administered by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Supreme Court
found that the Constitution has force and application in U.S. territories that are not States-"a
force not contingent upon acts of legislative grace." 553 U.S. at 757; see De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States,
182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
243 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762-65.
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tlement to the writ."244 All three considerations counseled in favor of ex-
tending habeas protections. First, the detainees disputed their status as
enemy combatants, but lacked any meaningful advocate or review process
under the CSRT determination.2 45 Second, while the sites of apprehension
and detention were all "technically" outside U.S. sovereignty, the detention
site was within de facto U.S. sovereignty. 246 Lastly, the costs or threats to
U.S. courts of hearing habeas claims were minimal; issuing the writ would
not be "impracticable or anomalous." 247
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that enemy combatants could in-
voke the protections of the Suspension Clause and seek the writ of habeas
corpus and that neither their status as detained enemy combatants nor their
location in Guantinamo was a barrier to application of this constitutional
provision. 248 Given that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 did "not
purport to be a formal suspension of the writ," Guantinamo prisoners re-
tained "the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their de-
tention."2 49 Congress could not avoid the requirements of the Suspension
Clause by looking to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which the Court
found a poor replacement for habeas procedures. 250
In so holding, the Court extended its post-9/11 detainee jurisprudence
to the furthest protection yet, granting constitutional habeas corpus rights to
foreign citizens captured in foreign lands and detained in Guantinamo as
enemy combatants. Lead petitioner Lakhdar Boumediene was released from
U.S. custody on May 15, 2009, and now lives in France.2 5 1
B. Boumediene's Limited Reach
The Supreme Court took pains-repeatedly-to stress that its holding
in Boumediene did not extend beyond that specific case. The Court iterated
that its "decision today holds only that petitioners before us are entitled to
seek the writ . . . and that petitioners in these cases need not exhaust the
review procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding with their
244 Id. at 766.
245 Id. at 767.
246 Id. at 768.
247 Id. at 769-70 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in
result)); see Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Govern-
ment, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 851, 871 (2010) (arguing that Boumediene marked the "triumph" of
the "impracticable and anomalous" test from Reid).
248 553 U.S. at 771 ("We hold that Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at
Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before
us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.").
249 Id.
250 Id. at 792. While finding the Detainee Treatment Act procedures wanting when
weighed against habeas corpus, the Court stressed that "[lt]he only law we identify as uncon-
stitutional is MCA § 7 .... Accordingly, both the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact."
Id. at 795.
21 See News Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, United States
Transfers Lakhdar Boumediene to France (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opalpr/2009/May/09-ag-477.html.
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habeas actions in the District Court." 25 2 Underscoring the unique historical
moment in which the Court decided Boumediene, the concluding paragraphs
of the majority opinion are a sad recognition of the law's role in these "ex-
traordinary times." 253 While the majority pondered the effects of its ruling,
it ignored any fallout from its extraordinary finding of de facto U.S. sover-
eignty over Guantinamo. 25 4 The Court's concern was that the executive
branch still protect us from "those who pose a real danger to our secur-
ity."255 This final concern echoed throughout the opinion, as the Court con-
sidered the litigants' status-"a prisoner deemed an enemy combatant" 256-
before their location-"a territory, like Guantanamo, over which the Gov-
ernment has total military and civil control."257
In dissent, Justice Scalia ridiculed the majority opinion as a "crazy re-
sult" for its inconsistent approach to what should be a clear analysis. 258 In
his view, the Constitution does not reach territories over which the United
States lacks sovereignty.259 The surface appeal of this view is obvious, as
consistency has value. Justice Scalia would have the Supreme Court main-
tain this clear analysis for any foreign national in U.S. hands in Guantinamo,
whether a refugee or a terrorist.
The result in Boumediene seems crazy for another reason: it contrasts
so vividly with the Eleventh Circuit's holding in CABA v. Christopher.26 0
This time around, after 9/11 and more than a decade after the Cuban rafter
crisis, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case involving Guantinamo
detainees claiming constitutional rights and found that the Constitution did
protect those detainees. The Court in Boumediene did not cite CABA at all,
252 553 U.S. at 795 (emphases added).
253 Id. at 797.
254 Id.255 Id.
2 5 6 Id. at 746-47.
257 Id.
218 Id. at 841 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 See id. at 834-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260 Cf Ernesto Hernindez-L6pez, Guantdnamo as a "Legal Black Hole": A Base for Ex-
panding Space, Markets, and Culture, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 141, 169 (2010) ("The Court fash-
ioned a functional test to determine which constitutional provisions apply to this overseas
location under American control."); James Park, Effectuating Principles of Justice in Ending
Indefinite Detention: Historical Repetition and the Case of the Uyghurs, 31 WHITTIER L. REv.
785, 806 (2010) ("Guantanamo Bay was argued to be the sovereign territory of the nation of
Cuba as a convenient fiction despite the years of isolation between the two nations. This
argument was shattered when the United States Supreme Court held that habeas corpus for
'War on Terror' detainees was due in Boumediene v. Bush, decided in 2008."); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259,
259 (2009) ("major question" arising from Boumediene's functional approach is "whether and
when foreign nationals who are not in U.S. custody (unlike the Boumediene petitioners) are
also potentially eligible for constitutional protection"); see also id. at 272 ("Conceivably, the
Boumediene majority considered it unnecessary to fully specify the baseline because the case
provided an adequate context-specific baseline, such as 'individuals in U.S. custody.'"); Sonia
R. Farber, Comment, Forgotten at Guantdnamo: The Boumediene Decision and Its Implica-
tions for Refugees at the Base Under the Obama Administration, 98 CAL. L. REv. 989, 1003
(2010) (Boumediene and Rasul "provide relief to refugees having as much, if not more, claim
to the protections of the U.S. legal system as their neighboring detainees at Guantinamo").
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for anything, not even a simple nod to an earlier Court of Appeals result in a
different direction.
If the Court had wanted to extend constitutional protections to individu-
als outside the enemy combatant category, it easily could have done so. The
majority cited Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,261 concerning Haitian
refugees held in Guantinamo prior to 9/11, and recognized that the govern-
ment took the view even then that "Guantanamo is territory 'outside the
United States.'"262 Moreover, post-9/11 detainee jurisprudence includes di-
rect links to the CABA case. The D.C. Circuit Court in Boumediene cited
CABA, 263 and both the D.C. Circuit and District Courts in Rasul discussed
and relied on CABA. 26 In deciding Boumediene, then, the Supreme Court
was undoubtedly aware of CABA's holding.
The Court's awareness of CABA was not the issue. Rather, the
Boumediene petitioners' status as detained enemy combatants was the issue.
That status both reconciles the cases and shows that the judicial sphere
yielded the appropriate outcome for the Guantinamo refugees.
IV. EVALUATING JUDICIAL OUTCOME
Court opinions crafted an important difference between the case of Cu-
ban and Haitian refugees in the mid-1990s and the case of enemy combat-
ants after the September 11th attacks. In CABA v. Christopher, the U.S.
military housed "migrants" in Guantdnamo "safe haven" camps, for only as
long as they wished, as a "gratuitous humanitarian act." 265 In Boumediene v.
Bush, the U.S. military "detained" "enemy combatants" in Guantdnamo
prisons, after apprehension "on the battlefield" abroad for killing and at-
tempting to kill Americans. 26 6 The CABA and Boumediene cases suggest that
the Constitution reaches enemy combatants but not migrants. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that there was no "legal answer" to the migrants' plight.2 67
And the Supreme Court's decision, limited on its terms to the "petitioners
before us," does not obviously apply to migrants or refugees.268
This result seems illogical because it appears counterintuitive for the
courts to confer constitutional protections on captured foreign citizens who
kill or attempt to kill Americans abroad-indeed attempt to destroy the
United States altogether-but not on refugees who display no such hostility
and instead desire to become part of this nation. The results from CABA and
261 509 U.S. 918 (1993).
262 553 U.S. at 753 (citing Brief for Petitioners in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.)
(emphasis in original).
26 476 F.3d at 992.
2" 321 F.3d at 1143; 215 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
265 43 F.3d at 1417, 1427.
266 553 U.S. at 734.
267 43 F.3d at 1430.
266 553 U.S. at 795.
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Boumediene, however, are consistent after all. Upon a deeper examination,
the results reflect the principles of our domestic criminal system.
A. Reconciling CABA and Boumediene
The Boumediene opinion contains, significantly, two analyses-both
necessary, neither alone sufficient. The Supreme Court's primary analysis
focused on the nature of the petitioners, i.e., detained enemy combatants; the
Court's secondary analysis focused on the nature of the location, i.e., de
facto U.S. sovereign territory.269 Under the secondary analysis, the Court's
"functional approach" to the Constitution's application in Boumediene is in-
consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's approach in CABA that Guantinamo
Bay was not "functionally equivalent" to land within U.S. borders.7 0 It is
also inconsistent with the Court's prior decision to deny certiorari in CABA.
Indeed, looking only at location-Guantinamo as the site of extraterritorial
constitutional reach-it is reasonable to think that the Supreme Court's opin-
ion provides a new avenue of judicial relief for refugees and undercuts the
result in CABA. But the primary analysis shows that, even accepting the
United States' de facto sovereignty over Guantinamo, it does matter who the
petitioners are when determining the extent of constitutional reach.27' Con-
trary to migrants in Guantinamo, the terrorists faced indefinite detention for
the rest of their lives.
The extreme circumstances of the Guantinamo cases underscore a fa-
miliar element in our domestic criminal justice system. Legal protections
attach to an individual's status, even at the expense of creating perverse in-
centives. A status based on alleged misconduct-for example, as a pre-trial
detainee charged with a felony-triggers certain rights and protections that
do not attach to a more innocuous status based on hopes and aspirations.
Analogously, threatening the United States triggers certain constitutional
protections, while seeking freedom there does not.
The Sixth Amendment stands as a ready example of constitutional
rights attaching to criminal status, particularly as it concerns just what the
Guantinamo refugees were requesting in their thousands of notes and letters:
legal representation. The Sixth Amendment confers the right to counsel on
an indigent defendant, but not just any indigent defendant.272 The right is
predicated on the risk of a loss of liberty. The Amendment provides, in
relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have
2 69 Id. at 739.
270 43 F.3d at 1425.
271 See 553 U.S. at 732, 795.
272 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). Similarly, Miranda rights under
the Fifth Amendment attach only upon custodial interrogation in criminal proceedings. See,
e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (Miranda measures are required "only
where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody'")
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)); accord Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (noting that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a
fundamental trial right of criminal defendants).
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the Assistance of counsel for his defence."2 73 By its terms, this constitu-
tional right to counsel exists for "criminal prosecutions" and attaches upon
commencement of judicial proceedings against the defendant, by "formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 27 4
The right, then, depends on criminal charges carrying a penalty of incarcera-
tion, and it protects a defendant at "critical stages" of the proceedings. 275
In contrast to a criminal defendant facing incarceration, a civil litigant
cannot claim these constitutional protections, as "the Sixth Amendment does
not govern civil cases." 27 6 In its few decisions concerning the right to coun-
sel in civil matters, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause requires the government to provide counsel in
certain cases where a civil litigant faces consequences akin to criminal con-
sequences-specifically the loss of liberty. 27 7 Thus, the State must pay for
counsel representation in a civil juvenile delinquency action that could result
in incarceration.278 But even so, the "Due Process Clause does not always
require the provision of counsel in civil proceedings where incarceration is
threatened."27 9 Rather, the Supreme Court has adopted a flexible test for
counsel provision for civil litigants, outside the strict application of Sixth
Amendment protections to criminal defendants. 28 0 For example, the State
need not pay for counsel representation in a civil contempt proceeding for an
indigent litigant subject to a child support order who faces incarceration,
where the opposing litigant lacks representation and the State provides alter-
native procedural safeguards. 281
In brief, neither criminal defendants facing penalties other than loss of
liberty nor civil litigants enjoy the constitutional guarantee of counsel. A
different status yields a different set of rights. Examining the opinions in
CABA and Boumediene, and accepting those opinions' depictions of the
facts, a similar distinction can be drawn across the types of petitioners as-
serting constitutional claims in each case. The petitioners in Boumediene,
who were designated by the executive branch as enemy combatants and who
faced indefinite detention in Guantinamo military prisons-analogous to
criminal defendants facing incarceration-were granted constitutional pro-
tections. The plaintiffs in CABA, who were designated by the executive and
judicial branches as migrants for their attempts to escape oppressive home-
land regimes and who received safe haven in Guantinamo camps for as long
273 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
274 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
275 See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004) ("The Sixth Amendment secures to a
defendant facing incarceration the right to counsel at all 'critical stages' of the criminal pro-
cess, including a plea hearing.") (internal citations omitted).
276 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011).
277 See id. (describing "handful of cases").
" See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-42 (1967).
27' Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518.
280 See id. at 2519-20.
"' See id. at 2520 (holding that "the Due Process Clause does not automatically require
the provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject
to a child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration") (emphasis in original).
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as they chose to stay-analogous to civil litigants-were denied constitu-
tional protections. 28 2
The judicial distinction between migrants in safe haven and enemy
combatants in military prison may exacerbate the perversity of incentives for
misconduct. However, it neatly overlaps with distinctions drawn every day
in criminal courthouses and dampens any thought that future refugees in de
facto U.S. sovereign land might invoke Boumediene to claim constitutional
rights. Interestingly, the rumors spreading among Cuban refugees in Guan-
tinamo foreshadowed this judicial view. The refugees expressed concern
that, while they languished "locked up" in camps, others who committed
felony crimes were transferred to the United States to be prosecuted under
U.S. laws. 283 Whether the rumor was true or false, the logic is the same:
misdeeds trigger rights and open courthouse doors.284
It is important to recognize that the issue of distinguishing between
types of petitioners and applying constitutional protections to one type
(criminal, indefinite detainee, enemy combatant) rather than the other (non-
criminal, temporary resident, migrant) is different than the issue of determin-
ing whether constitutional protections apply extraterritorially. Critically,
Boumediene offers a two-part analysis-status and location-and any reli-
ance on the opinion that focuses exclusively on one part is incomplete.
Prior to Boumediene, the Supreme Court had held in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez285 and Johnson v. Eisentrager286 that the criminal protec-
tions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not apply extraterritorially. 28 7
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the petitioner was a Mexican citizen accused of run-
ning a violent organization smuggling narcotics into the United States. 288 He
was apprehended by Mexican police officers and transported to California,
where he remained in pre-trial detention at the time of the Court's deci-
sion. 289 After petitioner's arrest, agents from the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency raided his Mexican residence and seized documents related to drug
smuggling. 29 0 The Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment grounds
under which the detainee could challenge the agents' search because "[alt
282 In his concurrence in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2551 (2009),
Justice Thomas links Boumediene and the Sixth Amendment in an analysis of the Framers'
understanding of the Confrontation Clause.
283 Counsel Request from Hector Medina Diaz, Guantinamo refugee No. 000 833 057, to
Osvaldo Soto, attorney (1994) (on file with author); see Orlando J. Cabrera, Attorney, Memo-
randum re: Diary of Events at the United States Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba No-
vember 7 to November 10, 1994 (Nov. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
2 The rumor may have been exaggerated to include the transfer element, as certain U.S.
criminal statutes apply to prosecutions of foreign nationals at the Guantinamo naval base. See,
e.g., United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117, 117 (4th Cir. 1990) (appeal of dismissal of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 and 2244 indictment of Jamaican national charged with sexual abuse of a minor at
GuantAnamo naval base).
285 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
286 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
287 See 494 U.S. at 274-75; 339 U.S. at 784-85.
288 494 U.S. at 262.
289 Id.
290
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the time of the search, he was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no
voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place searched was lo-
cated in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has no
application."2 91
Forty years earlier, in Eisentrager, petitioners were twenty-one German
nationals who had continued to fight allied troops in Japan after Germany's
surrender in World War 11.292 They were arrested and convicted in China for
violating the laws of war293 and then repatriated to Germany to serve their
sentences, all under the auspices and command of the U.S. military.29 4 The
Supreme Court denied these prisoners any Fifth Amendment right to chal-
lenge their trial, conviction, or imprisonment, holding that "the Constitution
does not confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military
trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a
government at war with the United States." 295
Boumediene may be read consistently with these prior holdings. Con-
trolling for type of detainee, the analyses turn on the reach of the Constitu-
tion to the type of location. While the United States claimed de facto
sovereignty over the location at issue in Boumediene-Guantinamo Bay-it
did not claim any sort of sovereignty over the location at issue in Verdugo-
Urquidez-Mexico-nor the locations at issue in Eisentrager-China and
Germany. 296 Similarly, Boumediene may be read consistently with CABA
because, controlling for the type of location, the analyses turn on the reach
of the Constitution to the type of petitioner. While the courts recognized
habeas corpus rights for enemy combatants in detention who tried to kill
291 Id. at 274-75. Two years after deciding Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Alvarez-Machain and further narrowed the constitutional protections for for-
eign citizens accused of crimes outside the United States. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). There, the
Court held that a federal court had jurisdiction over a Mexican citizen who had been kid-
napped and transferred from Mexico to the United States to face charges of killing a U.S.
federal agent. Id. at 659; see id. at 670 ("The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not
therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United States for violations of the criminal laws of
the United States.").
292 339 U.S. at 765-66. Justice Jackson, who authored the Eisentrager opinion, served as
Representative and Chief Counsel in the Nuremberg war crime trials from 1945 to 1946. From
1948 to 1950, when the Supreme Court decided Eisentrager, "over 200 German enemy aliens
confined by American military authorities abroad" filed habeas petitions in the Court. Id. at
768 n.1. Justice Jackson recused himself from those cases. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1138.
The German petitioners in Eisentrager, by contrast, were not convicted at Nuremberg. See id.
293 339 U.S. at 766.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 785; see id. at 771 ("[I]n extending constitutional protections beyond the citi-
zenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its
territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act."). The Court found it compelling
that applying Fifth Amendment rights to alien enemies would confer on them greater protec-
tions than apply to American soldiers: "American citizens conscripted into the military service
are thereby stripped of their Fifth Amendment rights and as members of the military establish-
ment are subject to its discipline, including military trials for offenses against aliens or Ameri-
cans." Id. at 783.
296 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
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Americans, the courts did not recognize due process rights for migrants in
safe haven who tried to join the United States.
Thus, CABA stands as a final statement from the Eleventh Circuit-
solidified by both the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in CABA and its
opinion in Boumediene-that Guantinamo refugees have no due process
rights under the Constitution. More specifically, the law stands as a denial
of constitutional rights to Guantinamo migrants rather than enemy combat-
ants. Guantinamo was, as CABA petitioners argued to the Supreme Court, a
constitutional rights-free zone 2 7-for anyone seeking freedom in the United
States and accepting the gratuitous humanitarian provision of safe harbor.
B. Potential Test Cases
In order to be a gratuitous humanitarian act and escape the reach of the
Constitution, 298 the housing of refugees on non-criminal grounds cannot be
indefinite or involuntary. The only way to preserve the distinctions articu-
lated above is to ensure that the provision of safe haven does not, by virtue
of duration or force, morph into indefinite detention. In CABA, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged and readily endorsed the government's pledge not to
hold the "migrants for an indefinite period of time or against their will" in
Guantdnamo camps. 29 9 In future cases, the line between safe haven and
forced detention may be less clear.
How long is too long for military housing to lose its cozy description as
safe haven and its exemption from due process? When does an impossible
choice between options create a condition of detention and trigger rights? A
flexible test emerges from Boumediene, reminiscent of the flexible test ap-
plied in Sixth Amendment civil cases." Following Boumediene, a court
must consider whether application of constitutional protections would be
"impracticable or anomalous."3 01 Two related, recent opinions from the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, both styled Kiyemba v. Obama,302
provided a potential test case but concluded without clear guidance on these
questions.
In the Kiyemba cases, seventeen Chinese Uighurs captured in Afghani-
stan soon after September 11, 2001, were held as enemy combatants in
Guantinamo camps. 3 The Uighurs are a Turkic Muslim minority in the
Xinjiang province of China, and these detainees were initially determined to
be enemy combatants based on their training in camps associated with al
297 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, CABA v. Christopher, 516 U.S. 913 (1995); see
Frank J. Murray, Court Rejects Appeal for Cuban Refugees 'Boat People' Lose Legal Fight for
Rights, WASH. THWEs, Oct. 11, 1995, at A4.
298 CABA, 43 F.3d at 1427.
21 Id. at 1418; see Memorandum from Jorge L. Hernandez-Torafio to Comm. for Freedom
of Guantanamo Detainees (Oct. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
"o See, e.g., Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519-20.
so' 553 U.S. at 770.
3 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
303 See 555 F.3d at 1023-24.
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Qaeda and the Taliban.304 Later, the detainees were determined not to be
enemy combatants.3 05
The Uighurs in Guantinamo petitioned for habeas relief to be released
into the United States and were granted such release by the D.C. District
Court. The government appealed, and the D.C. Circuit Court reversed, hold-
ing that federal courts lacked the authority to review the executive branch's
decision to exclude these foreign nationals from the United States.306 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.307 "New developments," however, de-
railed the high court's potential statement on the Uighurs' confinement.30 s
By the time the Supreme Court decided the case, all seventeen had received
an offer from a third country to resettle.3 09 Twelve accepted, while five re-
jected the offers and chose to remain in Guantinamo. 10 The Uighurs' stay in
Guantinamo, therefore, was neither indefinite nor involuntary when their
case reached the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Court vacated and re-
manded, 31' and the D.C. Circuit Court reaffirmed its prior position that "peti-
tioners never had a constitutional right to be brought to this country and
released." 312
Another potential test case is developing in the nascent prosecution of
Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame. 13 Warsame is a Somali national who was
captured by the U.S. military in international waters and accused of support-
ing al Qaeda. Rather than transferring Warsame to Guantinamo, military
officials held him on a U.S. naval vessel in international waters. In July
2011, after two months of detention and secret interrogations, Warsame en-
tered the civilian judicial system and now faces trial in federal court in New
York.
a See id. at 1024.
305 See id.
* See id. at 1026; see also 605 F.3d at 1048.
307 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009).
108 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 (2010) (per curiam).
" Id.; see Erik Eckholm, Out of Guantdnamo, Uighurs Bask in Bermuda, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2009, at A4; David Johnston, Uighurs Leave Guantdnamo for Palau, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2009, at A22.
3' 605 F.3d at 430; see Herndndez-L6pez, supra note 260, at 171 ("The most dramatic
example of how legal anomaly at Guantinamo develops and expands concerns the five re-
maining Uighurs at the base."); Park, supra note 260, at 801 ("Based on these landmark
Supreme Court decisions, the Uyghurs were finally given an opportunity for judicial redress to
combat their indefinite detention."); Farber, supra note 260, at 1017-20 (discussing case of
Uighurs).
-"' 130 S. Ct. at 1235.
312 605 F.3d at 1048 (reinstating original opinion, as modified "to take account of new
developments"). In his analysis of the interplay between the Due Process and Suspension
Clauses, Geltzer argues that the Kiyemba decisions affirm the D.C. Circuit's pre-Boumediene
view that Guantinamo detainees lack due process protections. See Geltzer, supra note 188, at
25 ("While the D.C. Circuit has thus held that, even after Boumediene, the Due Process Clause
does not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, it is worth noting a passage from the D.C. Circuit's
2007 opinion in Boumediene that might provide grounds for reconsideration of this position
should the issue ever be reassessed en banc.").
"I See Editorial, Terrorism and the Lw: The Case of a Somali Accused of Terrorism is
Ending Right, but Started Wrong, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 2011, at SRlI.
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The court presiding over Warsame's trial may have occasion to deter-
mine whether, for purposes of constitutional reach, a U.S. naval vessel on
the high seas is on par with the Guantdnamo naval base and, thus, the func-
tional equivalent of U.S. territory. 3 14 These sites are already comparable in
certain legal contexts."' If the court finds parity, then Boumediene supports
the application of constitutional habeas protections to enemy combatants de-
tained on such vessels and counsels against secret interrogations. This deter-
mination will become pressing in the event the Guantdnamo detention
centers ever close. On several key issues, then, the judicial line remains
blurred.
V. EVALUATING POLITICAL OUTCOME
In contrast to the judicial outcome of the Cuban rafter crisis in Guanti-
namo, there remains the truth of what happened on the ground. The political
sphere yielded a different, though also appropriate, outcome. The Cuban
refugees came to the United States. While the denial of constitutional rights
was appropriate based on judicial distinctions between migrants and enemy
combatants, the refugees' entry into the United States was appropriate based
on what was happening far away from the litigation.
At the start of the Cuban rafter crisis, Attorney General Reno stated that
the rafters would be "detained in appropriate facilities."316 In the trial court,
Judge Atkins ruled on issues concerning the "detained plaintiff refugees.""
In its initial rulings, the Eleventh Circuit granted attorneys access to the
"detainees." 11 The Guantinamo refugees certainly felt detained, even
"locked up" on the naval base,319 facing the impossible choice between stay-
ing in overcrowded, tense camps or repatriating to the same oppressive re-
gime they had recently fled. The refugees' escape attempts, unrest, and
confinement suggest that their living conditions were less akin to safe haven
residency and more akin to involuntary and seemingly indefinite detention.
314 Cf Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (taking "functional approach to questions of
extraterritoriality").
" See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (federal judicial power extends "to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction"); 18 U.S.C. § 7(1), (3) ("special maritime and territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States" includes both "[t]he high seas, any other waters within the admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof'
and "[a]ny lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive
or concurrent jurisdiction thereof"); cf United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933)
(noting that a merchant vessel "is deemed to be a part of the territory" of the sovereignty
whose flag it flies).
36 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (Aug. 19, 1994).
31 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 4,
13, CABA v. Christopher, No. 94-CV-2183 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 44).
3 Order by the Court at 2, CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995).
3'1 Counsel Request from Hector Medina Diaz, Guantinamo refugee No 000 833 057, to
Osvaldo Soto, attorney (1994) (on file with author).
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These conditions warranted release into the United States.320 In closing the
door on the Cuban and Haitian refugees, the Eleventh Circuit warned that
they had no "legal answer" and would have to find non-judicial remedies to
their plight.321 The refugees did just that.
In the aftermath of the rapid-fire CABA litigation in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit, and while the refugees briefed their
certiorari petition to the Supreme Court, those involved in the case looked
outside the court system for help. On January 31, 1995, the Dade County
Bar Association prepared a report to the American Bar Association House of
Delegates seeking a resolution "to protect the rights of Cuban and Haitian
refugees." 322
Within a few months, the Cuban refugees found a solution. They were
allowed to enter the United States under a May 2, 1995, humanitarian parole
announced by the Clinton administration. 323 Most of the Haitian refugees
had repatriated to Haiti after Aristide returned to power in October 1994,
with the last group leaving Guantinamo in November 1995.324 Under the
May 2nd plan, the Administration allowed nearly all of the 20,000 Cubans
remaining in Guantinamo to enter the United States, on a case-by-case basis,
as "special Guantinamo entrants." 325 The White House continued to use the
term "migrants" rather than "refugees," but finally opened U.S. doors.3 26
Cuban refugees were paroled into the United States at a rate of 500 to
550 per week, on three weekly flights from Guantdnamo to Homestead Air
320 Ethnographic data from the Guantinamo camps support the view that "safe haven"
was a misnomer and that the camps were detention centers. See Elizabeth Campisi, Guantd-
namo: Safe Haven or Traumatic Interlude?, 3 LATINO STUDIEs 375, 380 (Nov. 2005) ("While
people working in the larger political structures were figuring out what to do with them, the
balseros were experiencing trauma and stress distress in Guantinamo and elsewhere.").
321 CABA, 43 F.3d at 1430.
322 The American Bar Association adopted the resolution. See Am. Bar Ass'n, Interna-
tional Law Section Policy (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/inter-
national_1aw/policy/humanjrights.html.
323 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995); see also Mike Clary,
'Parole' Lets 6,000 Cuban Refugees Settle in the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at 14.
324 See Mireya Navarro, Last of Refugees From Cuba In '94 Flight Now Enter U.S., N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 1, 1996, at 8; Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995)
("[a] little over 400" Haitians in Guantinamo as of May 2, 1995).
325 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995). As of June 1995,
approximately 18,800 Cuban refugees remained in Guantinamo camps. See GAO REPORT,
U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIs, supra note 20, at 8; Refugee Appeal
Turned Down, AssOCIATED PRESs, Oct. 19, 1995; Frank J. Murray, Court Rejects Appeal for
Cuban Refugees; 'Boat People' Lose Legal Fight for Rights, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1995, at
A4 (U.S. had already admitted 10,000 Guantinamo refugees at time of Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari in CABA).
326 According to former Coast Guard officer Randy Beardsworth, the U.S. government's
strategy at the end of the 1994 rafter crisis depended on the political and legal determination
that Cuban nationals "rescued" or "picked up" at sea were migrants rather than refugees. See
E-mail from Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners, to author (July 17, 2011) (on file with
author); telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011).
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Force Base just south of Miami.3 27 On January 31, 1996, the last Cuban
refugees arrived in Homestead, and the U.S. government closed the tent
camps.3 28 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")
still runs a small migrant facility in GuantAnamo, holding approximately 400
people.3 29 ICE stands ready to "ramp up the camp" to handle up to 10,000
people in case of another mass migration.33 0
As a "companion accord" to its May 2nd humanitarian parole, the
Clinton administration revised the Cuban Adjustment Act, adopting the "wet
foot, dry foot" policy in effect today.3" Cuban refugees intercepted at sea
are returned to Cuba, while those reaching U.S. land can apply for perma-
nent resident alien status in the United States.33 2 Essentially, the "wet foot,
dry foot" policy shifted the location where the Cuban Adjustment Act takes
effect: now exclusively on land."
The Clinton administration also expressed "satisfaction" that the Castro
regime had "honored" its commitment not to inflict reprisals on refugees
who were repatriated.334 Yet, for all its supposed agreement with and assur-
ances to the United States, Cuba adopted no structural reforms in response to
327 GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS, supra note 20,
at 8. CABA plaintiff Lizbet Martinez, the twelve-year-old girl who played her violin in the
Guantinamo camps, entered the United States with her family in January 1995. The Miami
exile community gifted her with a Stradivarius violin. She is now an elementary school
teacher in Hialeah, Florida. See John Lantigua, Fiddler on the Move: Girl Rafter To Be Let In,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13, 1995, at 1A; Peggy Landers, Refugee Violinist Getting New Instru-
ment, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 5, 1995 at 2B.
328 See United States Navy Fact File, Naval Station Guantinamo Bay, Cuba (Nov. 8,
2011); Mireya Navarro, Last of Refugees From Cuba In '94 Flight Now Enter U.S., N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1996, at 8. The balseros were finally welcome in America, but their post-
Guantinamo lives were not without hardship. With 2000 Cuban refugees arriving each month
in South Florida, many faced a lack of jobs and sponsors. See Mirta Ojito, Many Rafters Face
Hard Times In New Land Problems Could Grow As Refugees Keep Coming, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 14, 1995, at 1A.
3' See United States Navy Fact File, Naval Station Guantinamo Bay, Cuba (Nov. 8, 2011)
("The migrants are either interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard or asylum seekers who
make it across the border by land or by water. . . . If officials find the interdictees or asylum
seekers have legitimate grounds to be granted asylum, they are eventually moved to a third-
party country, generally in Latin America.").
330 Telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011); E-
mail from Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners, to author (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with
author).
33 Fact Sheet: Cuba-U.S. Migration Accord, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs (Aug. 28, 2000) ("Under a May 1995 companion accord, the United States
began returning Cubans interdicted at sea or entering the U.S. Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay
who did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned.").
332 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995).
. Telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011).
33 Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, Press Briefing (May 2, 1995); see Fact Sheet:
Cuba-U.S. Migration Accord, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Af-
fairs (Aug. 28, 2000).
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the balseros crisis. 35 According to Human Rights Watch, Cuba's violation
of basic human rights continues unabated.336
A main motivation for the Clinton administration's May 2nd parole was
the lack of safety and stability at the Guantdnamo camps. Military com-
manders convinced the White House that holding 20,000 refugees indefi-
nitely in camps would cause further riots.337 The military had always seen its
function in housing the Cuban rafters as humanitarian, which was in tension
with the true meaning and purpose of Guantinamo Bay as a naval base.
According to a former Coast Guard officer, "the military has always hated
dealing with migrants in Guantdnamo. Their perspective was that they didn't
sign up for that; it was not their mission."338 The military did not want to be
"managing migrant camps," and so commanders were "always pushing to
close the camps."'339 Housing tens of thousands of Cuban rafters in Guanti-
namo was simply not sustainable.
This motivation from the military echoed the motivation for CABA
plaintiffs' requests in the Southern District of Florida to stop repatriation
based on coercion. Plaintiffs had argued that the refugees' situation was un-
reasonable and that their choice between staying or going home was impos-
sible. In the end, the refugees received the relief they had always sought:
entry into the United States. The governmental branch that granted this relief
was the executive, which, with military personnel on the ground, recognized
the harsh truth of the camps. Relief did not come from the courts, which
told a story of difficult but hopeful conditions for "migrants."
VI. CONCLUSION
The contrasting outcomes of the 1994 Cuban rafter crisis in Guanti-
namo reflect contrasting depictions of the crisis. In the political sphere, the
military and the White House reacted to the desperation of thousands of
. See Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba's Rights Violations Persist Despite Advances, Group Says,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 10, 1995, at 6A (citing Human Rights Watch/America).
336 See id.; Human Rights Watch, Cuba: Dissident's Death Highlights Repressive Tactics
(Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/americas/cuba. In early 1996, thirteen Cuban
refugees who had been intercepted in rafts and returned to Cuba under the United States' new
"wet foot, dry foot" policy complained of threats from Cuban state agents, arrests, and accusa-
tions that they worked for the CIA. See Larry Rohter, Returned Rafters: Cuba Defying Pact,
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 1996, at 17A. Former Coast Guard officer Randy Beard-
sworth remarked that, even after resolution of the rafter crisis and adoption of new policy, ICE
is unable to deport more than 10,000 Cuban nationals with final orders of deportation, most of
whom are criminals, "because of the relationship with Cuba." Telephone interview with
Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011).
. See Refugee Appeal Turned Down, ASSOCIATED PRESs, Oct. 19, 1995. In September
1995, the General Accounting Office called the conditions in Guantdinamo "difficult but, we
believe, adequate." See GAO REPORT, U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN MIGRATION CRI-
sis, supra note 20, at 2.
. Telephone interview with Randy Beardsworth, Catalyst Partners (July 22, 2011).
3 Id.
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balseros with nowhere to go. Similar to the Haitians who repatriated after
the return of their democratically elected leader, the Cubans proactively
sought to remedy their situation and ultimately obtained parole. In the judi-
cial sphere, courts denied constitutional rights to migrants in safe haven, but
granted constitutional rights to enemy combatants in detention. While en-
emy combatants later became embroiled in the court system facing trials and
prison sentences, the balseros ended up outside the court system starting
new lives in the United States. Each sphere reached the appropriate outcome
on its terms, and the brisas del mar finally directed the refugees to freedom.
